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Article

Reconsidering Fictitious Pricing
David Adam Friedman

†

INTRODUCTION
On Black Friday, 2014, United States Senator Richard
Blumenthal stood in front of a prominent regional retail outlet
1
mall to “look at some of the merchandise and see what shop2
pers [were] doing.” Earlier that day, Senator Blumenthal expressed concern “that some outlet store bargains featuring allegedly reduced prices on brand name products may actually be
3
selling goods of lesser quality using deceptive pricing.” The
Senator, invoking a “where there’s smoke, there’s fire” argument, remarked that eleven class action lawsuits had been filed
nationally involving deceptive-pricing practices at retail outlet
4
stores. His public demonstration echoed a letter he and three
other members of Congress had sent to the chairwoman of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), urging enforcement action
against outlet stores engaging in deceptive pricing, including
† Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University. B.A., Yale College;
J.D., Yale Law School. Thank you to Laura Appleman, Curtis Bridgeman, Jim
Hawkins, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Michael Mannheimer, Peter Molk, Jeffrey
Standen, Ahmed Taha, and Spencer Weber Waller for extensive comments.
The faculties of Northern Kentucky Chase College of Law and the Willamette
University College of Law also offered insights and suggestions, as did participants at the 2015 International Contracts Conference at UNLV Boyd School of
Law. Librarian Mary Rumsey provided valuable support. Copyright © 2016 by
David Adam Friedman.
1. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines “outlet stores” as “retail
stores, shops and other establishments in which manufacturers sell their stock
and other merchandise directly to the public through factory-direct-toconsumer branded store locations at discounted prices, and which are often
used by manufacturers to liquidate stock.” Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 151 F.T.C.
23, 36 (2011).
2. Gregory B. Hladky, Blumenthal Warns Holiday Shoppers About Outlets Using Deceptive Pricing, Advertising, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov.
28, 2014), http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-blumenthal-outlet-shop-warning
-20141128-story.html.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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representing current prices as discounts from a fictitious regu5
lar price. This letter marked the highest profile federal-level
call to address fictitious-pricing practices in decades. The FTC,
after decades of frequent enforcement, ceased prosecution of
6
fictitious-pricing actions in 1969.
Beyond congressional letters and press events, the acceleration of deceptive discount pricing practices has drawn critiques from other quarters. Referring to advertised discounts as
“silliness,” a former senior Sears executive confessed to the
Wall Street Journal, that “the original price from which [a retail-price] discount is computed is often specious . . . because
items hardly ever sell at that price, which makes the discount
7
less legitimate.”
This Article uses “fictitious pricing” to describe this common advertising tactic frowned upon by the FTC Guides. Advertisers offer discounts based off a prior-reference price. An
item advertised for sale at $80 at “20% off” presumably was offered for sale in good faith at a reference price of $100. If the
advertiser never offered the good at $100, the prior-reference
price was “fictitious,” rendering the entirety of the price presentation “fictitious.” The FTC Guides advise sellers that “[i]f . . .
the former price being advertised is not bona fide but fictitious—for example, where an artificial, inflated price was established for the purpose of enabling the subsequent offer of a
8
large reduction—the ‘bargain’ being advertised is . . . false.”

5. See Letter from Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Senator, et al. to Edith
Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www
.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/sens-and-rep-to-ftc-outlet-stores-may-be
-misleading-consumers. The FTC declined the invitation to investigate the allegations because it had not “received enough consumer complaints.” Hladky,
supra note 2. Blumenthal deemed this a “ridiculous, ludicrous reason,” because “the FTC has no particular threshold number of consumer complaints
necessary to trigger a probe.” Id. Also, an individual consumer may have difficulty detecting harm through the fog of the deceptive scheme.
6. The last standalone FTC mention of “fictitious” pricing appeared in an
order on December 31, 1970, a follow-through of a holdover complaint filed in
1969. See Hollywood Credit Clothing Co., 77 F.T.C. 1594, 1604–05 (1970). In
1969, the FTC confronted high-profile, broad, and blunt critiques that through
“bureaucratic inertia” and “lethargy,” the agency had an unfortunate tradition
of wasting resources on “trivial pursuits.” Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and
New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 343–44, 349 (2008); see also William
MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its
Limits in Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 943 (2005).
7. Suzanne Kapner, The Dirty Secret of Black Friday “Discounts,” WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023042810
04579217863262940166.
8. 16 C.F.R. § 233.1 (2014) (emphasis added).
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As a marketing practice, discount advertising, bona fide
9
and fictitious, has proliferated recently. Discounting has increased in frequency and in degree. According to one analysis,
from 2009 to 2012, the number of discount offers increased six10
ty-three percent. Over the same time period, the average discount offered moved from twenty-five percent to thirty-six per11
cent. Given the increased frequency of overall discounting,
does fictitious pricing warrant concern? Does fictitious pricing
inflict harm?
An individual or collective remedy may be challenging to
frame for consumers claiming that false prior-reference prices
induced their transaction. However, “a large body of evidence
show[s] that the presence of a reference price increases consumers’ deal valuations and purchase intentions and can lower
12
their search intentions . . . .” Writ large, this type of practice
has a broad effect on the integrity of competition in retail markets and consumer welfare, which regulators should address.
Basic behavioral economics amplifies the effect of fictitious
pricing because the tactic can induce transactions by enhancing
the perceived value of a transaction. For welfare reasons, deceptive-pricing practices deserve renewed scrutiny.
Though a dormant area for public federal enforcement
13
since 1969, private litigants recently have invoked fictitious
9. See Larry D. Compeau et al., Comparative Price Advertising: Believe It
or Not, 36 J. CONSUMER AFF. 284, 284 (2002) (“Advertisers’ attempts to enhance consumers’ perceptions of the value of a deal by using comparative price
advertisements, in which they . . . compare the selling price to some suggested
reference price, is widespread . . . . [A] crucial issue concerns the deceptive
power of comparative price advertising that provides inflated and exaggerated
reference prices.”).
10. Kapner, supra note 7 (describing tracking of discount practices at thirty-one retailers).
11. Id.
12. Gorkan Ahmetoglu et al., Pricing Practices: A Critical Review of Their
Effects on Consumers, 21 J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVS. 696, 699 (2014);
see, e.g., Dhruv Grewal & Larry D. Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising:
Informative or Deceptive?, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 52, 55–58 (1992)
[hereinafter Grewal & Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising] (containing a
meta-analysis cited by the Ninth Circuit in Hinojos and serving as a “credible
basis” for Professor Compeau’s testimony in the Overstock.com litigation). A
more recent analysis also supported findings that fictitious pricing negatively
affects welfare. See Mark Armstrong & Yongmin Chen, Discount Pricing 25–
26 (Univ. of Oxford, Dep’t of Econ., Discussion Paper Series No. 605, 2012),
http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/5819/paper605.pdf.
13. See discussion supra note 6; see also Carleton A. Harkrader, Fictitious
Pricing and the FTC: A New Look at an Old Dodge, 37 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 3–
4 (1962) (noting that fictitious pricing actions emerged as the “leading type of
deception practiced in violation of the FTC Act”).
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pricing claims with mixed results—in part because harm
14
proves difficult for private litigants to allege. A recent spate of
15
private class actions involving retail-outlet fictitious pricing, if
successful, may resurrect scrutiny of this suspect advertising
practice. Some states have sporadically filled the federal en16
17
forcement vacuum, bringing different statutory standards,
14. For a typical result favoring the advertiser, see Kim v. Carter’s, Inc.,
598 F.3d 362, 365–66 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that there was no identifiable
pecuniary harm to the consumer if an item was sold at a discount from a fictitious price because the actual price charged at the point-of-sale served as the
contractual price); see also B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 258
F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming judgment where a small retailer failed to
prove that a competitor’s fictitious pricing caused harm); Johnson v. Jos. A.
Bank Clothiers, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-756, 2014 WL 4129576 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19,
2014) (dismissing class action claims for failure to allege actual damages);
Camasta v. Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-08285, 2013 WL 4495661
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013) (dismissing a claim brought under Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act); Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., No. 12 C 7782, 2013 WL 3866507 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2013) (dismissing
a consumer complaint for failure to allege actual damages); Mulligan v. QVC,
Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (granting summary judgment to a
retailer when a consumer failed to establish damages). For an atypical result
favoring the consumer, see Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1105 (9th
Cir. 2013) where the plaintiff consumer successfully
allege[s] an economic injury under [California statutes]. [He alleges]
that the advertised discounts conveyed false information about the
goods he purchased, i.e., that the goods he purchased sold at a substantially higher price at [the retailer] in the recent past and/or in the
prevailing market. He also alleges that he would not have purchased
the goods in question absent this misrepresentation.
This was deemed sufficient for the plaintiff to proceed.
15. As of December 2014, at least eleven private civil complaints about
fictitious pricing in retail outlet stores had been filed. See, e.g., Complaint, Rubenstein v. Neiman Marcus Grp. L.L.C., No. CV 14-07155 SJO (JPRx) (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 2, 2015), 2015 WL 1841254; Complaint, Branca v. Nordstrom, Inc.,
No. 3:14-cv-2062 MMA JMA (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014), 2014 WL 4313226; First
Amended Complaint, Gattinella v. Michael Kors (USA), Inc., No. 1:14-cv-5731
(WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014). It does appear that some of these cases were
brought by the same law firm in a coordinated manner.
16. See, e.g., People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RG10-546833, 2014 WL
657516 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2014) (finding Overstock.com in violation of
California Fair Advertising Law); Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to
New York Executive Law § 63(15), In re Michaels Stores, Inc. (2011) [hereinafter Assurance of Discontinuance, Michaels] (on file with author) (consent decree between New York Attorney General and Michaels Stores concerning misleading sales promotions); Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to New York
Executive Law § 63(15), In re Jos. A Bank Clothiers, Inc. (2004) [hereinafter
Assurance of Discontinuance, Jos. A. Bank], http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/
default/files/press-releases/archived/sep14a_04_attach1.pdf (consent decree
between retailer and the New York Attorney General that includes a mandate
for the retailer to comply with the FTC Guides on Prior-Reference Pricing).
17. See generally Robert Pitofsky et al., Pricing Laws Are No Bargain for
Consumers, 18 ANTITRUST 62, 64 (2004) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Pricing Laws]
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18

complicating compliance for national retailers. If these private
and state actions prove unsuccessful and yield uneven results,
the FTC should consider, in measured form, resurrecting enforcement of fictitious pricing in a manner that directly addresses welfare harm from the practice.
The FTC discontinued enforcement of fictitious pricing be19
cause, as Robert Pitofsky explained in 1977, the Commission
determined that discount retailers needed to be nurtured to
20
foster price competition. Regulatory intervention, Pitofsky argued, would dampen the aggression of these rising retailers.
Today’s retail marketplace, however, presents a vastly changed
landscape that compels reconsideration of enforcement.
Public intervention would be required to dampen fictitious
pricing, given that private civil actions and piecemeal state actions have not effectively addressed this growing phenomenon.
In Part I, this Article describes and adopts the FTC’s definition
of fictitious pricing. This Article further explains, using basic
tenets of behavioral economics, why discount pricing proves effective, which further informs why fictitious pricing warrants
extra scrutiny. In Part II, this Article describes the challenge of
conceptualizing individual harm and fashioning appropriate direct remedies for consumers. Recent private litigation under Illinois and California law illustrates these challenges. Part III
presents evidence of a broader, negative welfare impact from
fictitious pricing, justifying a degree of regulatory intervention.
This Article explores the literature supporting this conclusion.
This Article further argues that the courses recently taken in
California and New York mirror a sensible analytical framework for regulators. In Part IV, this Article prescribes exploring targeted federal regulatory intervention to dampen fictitious-pricing practices, after a nearly fifty-year hiatus. The
FTC should start by regulating in narrower spheres where retailers emphasize discounts of high-quality brands, or heavily
market their sales channels as discount-focused. Federal regulation would proactively enable retailers to enjoy the uniformi(describing the practical difficulties created by varying state laws).
18. See generally id. at 63–64.
19. Pitofsky has been described as a “Founding Father” of the “modern
Federal Trade Commission.” Timothy Muris, Robert Pitofsky: Public Servant
and Scholar, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 25, 25 (2001).
20. Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 687–88 (1977) [hereinafter Pitofsky,
Beyond Nader]. In a shorter piece in 2004, Pitofsky reiterated similar concerns
about enforcing fictitious pricing. See Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at
62.
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21

ty that state enforcement will not offer.

I. FICTITIOUS PRICING AND THE POWER OF DISCOUNT
ADVERTISING
In early years, the FTC prosecuted fictitious-pricing actions without any guidance to sellers about how to comply with
standards for pricing. In 1958, the FTC first brought form to
the boundaries of lawful prior-reference pricing through the
22
promulgation of the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing. The
23
FTC relaxed the Guides in 1964, and in 1967 it shaped them
24
into their current form. Until 1969, FTC fictitious-pricing ac25
tions were fairly common. After a major overhaul of the FTC
and the Commission’s priorities in the early Nixon Administra26
tion, federal public enforcement stopped completely, and this
27
posture holds today. Moving to the present, in December of
21. See generally Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 63–64. (advocating for the eradication of state regulation).
22. Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 23 Fed. Reg. 7965 (Oct. 15, 1958).
23. 16 C.F.R. § 14.10(a)(2) (1966) (adopted Jan. 8, 1964).
24. 16 C.F.R. § 233.1(a) (2015); 32 Fed. Reg. 15534–36 (Nov. 8, 1967). This
version of the Guides enjoyed a short shelf life for FTC usage, given subsequent non-enforcement.
25. Right until the drastic changes of 1969, the FTC continued to pursue
enforcement vigorously and with a measure of institutional pride. In the 1968
FTC Annual Report, the FTC prominently mentioned fictitious pricing: “In
addition to . . . complaint[s] received by mail, 570,142 . . . advertisements were
monitored . . . to determine how best they could be corrected. The diversity
was legion but among the favorites were . . . . fictitious pricing of countless
products.” FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 8
(1968).
26. Edward F. Cox, Reinvigorating the FTC: The Nader Report and the
Rise of Consumer Advocacy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 900–01 (2005). Cox, the
author of the article, was a “Raider.” Id. at 899; see also ABA, REPORT OF THE
ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 86, 95 (1969)
[hereinafter 1969 ABA REPORT] (criticizing the direction of the FTC prior to
1969); RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE 165 (2d ed. 1996) (describing changes to the FTC in the late
1960s); JUSTIN MARTIN, NADER: CRUSADER, SPOILER, ICON 81 (2002) (“Nader’s
FTC raid really did accomplish something; his seven children really did manage to lead the adults. In 1969 Richard Nixon, newly elected as president,
asked the American Bar Association to conduct an independent investigation
of the FTC. [The ABA’s conclusions were] remarkably similar to the conclusions of Nader’s Raiders . . . .”); Letter from President Richard Nixon to William T. Gossett, President, Am. Bar Ass’n (Apr. 18, 1969).
27. See discussion supra note 6. In 1980, all four instances of “fictitious
pricing” behavior referenced in FTC consent judgments were accompanied by
primary charges of related deceptive practices, like bait-and-switch, or false
energy-saving claims. FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 26–27 (1980). After 1980, all mentions of “fictitious pricing” completely
disappeared from the FTC Reporter.

2016]

RECONSIDERING FICTITIOUS PRICING

927

28

2014 the New York Times presented findings from the shop29
30
ping-advocacy websites The Wirecutter and Sweethome that
less than one percent of 54,000 “holiday deals,” were “worth
31
your time.” Not all of these deals were deemed “bad deals” due
to improper discounting. However, the website researchers singled out as “one of the most common holiday gimmicks,” the
presentation of an item as discounted from a prior “suggested
32
price”—a price that does not reflect a “normal sales price.”
As an example of “improper discounting,” the editor of the
websites cited an online deal offered by Macy’s for a toaster ov33
en. Macy’s priced the toaster oven at $252, presenting it as a
discount off a special sale price of $280, a reduction compounded by an additional ten percent offer-code discount, ultimately
34
reflecting an advertised regular price of $417. Amazon and
Best Buy advertised this very same toaster at a straight-up
price of $250 for several months but without a reference price
35
that would have reflected the “discounts” listed by Macy’s. If
$417 truly reflected the Macy’s bona-fide price offering at one
time in the past, the advertised discount would be powerful but
36
not fictitious.
Why would a retailer signal a price discount off of such a
questionable calculation? Among other reasons, perhaps to exploit consumer behavioral tendencies by presenting a pricing
“anchor” to shoppers that signals that the item has high value
and that the consumer is getting a bargain. Some consumers
will take the discount as a signal to stop shopping, even though
28. Farhad Manjoo, Online Deals for Holiday Shopping: Buyer Beware,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014, at B1; see also Lydia DePillis, Holiday Sales Are a
Dirty Lie, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonkblog/wp/2013/11/26/holiday-sales-are-a-dirty-lie (describing Black
Friday “doorbuster” discount sales as an “elaborate con”).
29. WIRECUTTER, http://wirecutter.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
30. SWEETHOME, http://sweethome.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
31. Manjoo, supra note 28. The editors of the sites dedicate twenty fulltime writers to investigate retail deals during the holiday season. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Macy’s defended this advertised markdown practice with a series of
non-sequiturs, noting that:
advertised ‘regular’ prices are ‘based on many different factors, including the cost of the item, overhead, benefits we offer . . . as well as
our ability to offer the item at a lower price during sale events’ and
further, that Macy’s had expressly disclaimed the representation that
any sales had been made at $417.
Id.
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in the case of Macy’s they could have saved a few dollars had
they continued. Consumers who bought from Macy’s before
finding the lowest price paid almost a one-percent premium
over a purchase from a competitor. More significant, perhaps,
Macy’s would take a sale away from an honest competitor at a
gross margin likely above thirty percent, a compelling motive to
37
employ this advertising tactic.
In Section A, this Article moves from the above Macy’s anecdote toward a formal definition of fictitious pricing. For the
purposes of this Article, the definition of fictitious priorreference pricing offered by the FTC and flesh out its boundaries by exploring a hypothetical retail scenario. Having established the definition of fictitious pricing, in Section B, this
Article explains the behavioral economics that make discount
advertising powerful, with the notion that extra scrutiny of discount pricing is warranted because of the potential for manipulation of consumer biases.
A. FICTITIOUS PRICING DEFINED
This Article uses “fictitious pricing” and “deceptive pricing”
interchangeably with “false prior-reference pricing.” Broadly,
“deceptive pricing,” as defined by the FTC Guides, encompasses
38
a related range of pricing tactics, from fictitious former-price
39
40
comparisons, to false retail-price comparisons, misleading
41
use of a manufacturer’s suggested price, and bargains based
42
on the purchase of other articles.
37. Cf. Macy’s Gross Profit Margin (Quarterly), YCHARTS, https://ycharts
.com/companies/M/gross_profit_margin (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (indicating
that Macy’s gross profit margin has been over 30% for the past five years).
38. 16 C.F.R. § 233 (2014).
39. Id. § 233.1(a) (“[W]here an artificial, inflated price was established [by
the advertiser] for the purpose of enabling the subsequent offer of a large reduction—the ‘bargain’ being advertised is a false one . . . .”).
40. Id. § 233.2(a) (“[A]dvertising . . . pric[ing as being] lower than those
being charged by others for the same merchandise in the advertiser’s trade
area . . . may be done . . . but . . . the advertised higher price must . . . not be
fictitious or misleading.”).
41. Id. § 233.3(a) (“[If] suggested retail prices do not in fact correspond to
prices at which a substantial number of sales of the article in question are
made, the advertisement of a reduction [from the suggested retail price] may
mislead the consumer.”).
42. Id. § 233.4(a) (“Frequently, advertisers choose to offer bargains in the
form of additional merchandise to be given a customer on the condition that he
purchase a particular article at the price usually offered by the advertiser. . . .
Representative of the language frequently employed in such offers are ‘Free,’
‘Buy One—Get One Free,’ ‘2-For-1 Sale,’ ‘Half Price Sale,’ ‘1¢ Sale,’ ‘50% Off,’
etc. . . . . It is important . . . that where such a form of offer is used, care be
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The FTC guidance on fictitious pricing reflects a consideration of the useful functions of honest discount pricing. Discount-pricing advertising, if truthful in presenting the former
price, benefits both buyers and sellers. Express presentation of
the former price as a reference point provides consumers valuable information. The seller signals that a “bargain” opportunity, a departure from “regular” pricing, exists. Such a deal will
likely draw more attention from consumers than items that
hold to a “regular” price. Sellers can benefit by moving previously overpriced (or mispriced) inventory, and more buyers will
enter the market to purchase at the lower price, especially
when informed about the special nature of the low price. Competitors may, in turn, respond to discounts with more price
cuts, which benefit consumers.
However, if the advertised former reference price is expressly or implicitly a false representation, meaning that the
method for selling the good involved luring consumers by representing something untrue, then the advertised price is fictitious. The effects of fictitious pricing can be unduly distortive.
The FTC, in the past, regulated prior-reference discounting be43
havior through enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act, which
44
declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” The
FTC provides sellers with more detailed “Guides” on a range of
45
market behaviors, including deceptive pricing. FTC Guides do
not have the force of law, but they “provide the basis for voluntary and simultaneous abandonment of unlawful practices by
members of industry. Failure to comply with the guides may
result in corrective action by the Commission under applicable
46
statutory provisions.” The FTC situated guidance on fictitious
taken not to mislead the consumer.”).
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)–(c) (2012) (describing the FTC’s enforcement authority).
44. Id. § 45(a). Though advertising practices can be regulated either
through “unfairness” or “deception,” the FTC has prosecuted most advertising
cases through the “deception” standard. The deception standard differs from
the unfairness standard, and both standards evolved separately. See JOHN A.
SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 67 (3d ed. 2007); see
also DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
THE LAW § 11:1 (2015).
45. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 233.1.
46. 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (2014) (emphasis added). The FTC has long held that
the Guides must be subject to consistent interpretation. Crown Publishers
Inc., 66 F.T.C. 1488, 1496 (1964) (“[W]ords and phrases of the type set out in
the ‘Guides’ must be consistently dealt with by the Commission or its decisions
will have no meaning or value. Only by consistent interpretation can some order be brought to the semantic jungle of advertising.” (quoting Gimbel Bros.
Inc., 61 F.T.C. 1051, 1073 (1962))). Gimbel Bros. “practically gives the Guides
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pricing within the guidance on deceptive pricing. Though fictitious pricing encompasses practices broader than former-price
comparisons, such as competitor comparisons, this Article focuses on fictitious pricing in the former price-comparison context.
1. FTC Guide on Former Price Comparisons
The FTC Guide on Former Price Comparisons describes
48
what constitutes deception when a seller offers an article at a
49
price that expressly references a prior price by that seller. The
Guide first defines a “true bargain”:
If the former price is the actual, bona fide price at which the article
was offered to the public on a regular basis for a reasonably substantial period of time, it provides a legitimate basis for the advertising of
a price comparison. Where the former price is genuine, the bargain
50
being advertised is a true one.

Then, the FTC informs sellers where discount-pricing tactics cross over into dishonest and deceptive territory:
If . . . the former price being advertised is not bona fide but fictitious—for example, where an artificial, inflated price was established
for the purpose of enabling the subsequent offer of a large reduction—
the “bargain” being advertised is a false one; the purchaser is not receiving the unusual value he expects. In such a case, the “reduced”
51
price is, in reality, probably just the seller’s regular price.

Examples of deceptive prior-reference price discounting offered by the Guide include a scenario where a seller tests a
higher price point for an article for “only a few days,” and then,
after the test fails, lowers the price back to the regular price,
52
labeling it as a discount. This discount is “not genuine.” The
Guide further points to practices where the seller “might use a
price at which he never offered the article at all,” or one “not
used in the regular course of business . . . [nor] used in the recent past but at some remote period in the past, without mak53
ing disclosure of that fact.” A “non-genuine” bargain “might
the force of a legal presumption.” Ira M. Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 472 n.165 (1964); see
also Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of
Consumer Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 397 (2007) (describing the
FTC’s approach to enforcing Section 5 and guiding commercial actors).
47. 16 C.F.R. § 233.
48. More precisely, what the FTC warned sellers could constitute deception, potentially triggering an action.
49. 16 C.F.R. § 233.1.
50. Id. § 233.1(a).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 233.1(c).
53. Id. § 233.1(d).
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use a price that was not openly offered to the public” or one
that was offered but was immediately reduced after an unrea54
sonable period of time. Note that the current Guide does not
require proof of actual sales of the article at the reference price
in order to establish the reference price, but the original 1958
55
Guide did. The current Guide lowered the bar for seller behavior; sellers merely have to prove that the article was offered at
the prior price in good faith.
The Guide also advises sellers to take caution whenever
accompanying price terms with words like “Regularly,” “Usual56
ly,” and “Formerly.” Even the plain use of the word “Sale,” according to the Guide, should cause the advertiser to “take care
that the amount of reduction is not so insignificant as to be
meaningless. It should be sufficiently large that the consumer,
if he knew what it was, would believe that a genuine bargain or
57
saving was being offered.”
The Guide effectively provided retailers a rulebook—a quasi-safe harbor—useful in the era when the FTC pursued enforcement. Pricing tactics that have emerged as the modern retail norm regularly cross the Guide’s boundaries of lawful
behavior. Applying the Guide’s standards to a real example
from the market illustrates this point.
2. Illustrative Application of Guide
For context about the complexity of regulating pricing
strategies, consider this actual example of how a major retailer
marked and priced sweaters:
A supplier sells the sweater to a retailer for roughly $14.50. The suggested retail price is $50, which gives the retailer a roughly 70%
markup. A few sweaters sell at that price, but more sell at the first
markdown of $44.99, and the bulk sell at the final discount price of
$21.99 [advertised over fifty-percent off]. That produces an average
unit retail price of $28 and gives the store about a 45% gross margin
59
on the product.

How would the Guide apply to this factual scenario? If the
original price of $49.99 constituted the “actual, bona fide
price . . . offered to the public on a regular basis for a reasona54. Id.
55. See infra Part I.C.
56. 16 C.F.R. § 233.1(e).
57. Id. The Guides clarify: “An advertiser who claims that an item has
been ‘Reduced to $9.99,’ when the former price was $10, is misleading the consumer, who will understand the claim to mean that a much greater, and not
merely nominal, reduction was being offered.” Id.
59. See Kapner, supra note 7 (discussing an example provided by a retail
industry consultant).
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bly substantial period of time,” the advertised former price
would be “genuine,” the comparison basis “legitimate,” and the
60
bargain, “true.” By the Guide’s criteria, the duration of the
$50 offer is material. The Guide advises that the duration of
“only a few days” would not suffice, but a longer time lays
foundation for offering the price on a “regular basis” or a “sub61
stantial period of time.”
Complicating the matter, however, the Guide indicates
that discounting tactics cross the line when “the purchaser
62
[does] not receiv[e] the unusual value he expects.” Given the
prevalence of discounting practices, a purchaser may have, especially after decades without federal enforcement, a low
threshold for the “value he expects.” In an environment of omnipresent discounting, consumers may have skewed perceptions of value. Though it is hard to imagine that an enforcement-focused FTC would allow the deceptive behavior to negate
the rule by defining the norm downward, it is possible that policymakers are not frothing to intervene because consumers
63
have no expectation of honest pricing. The problem may be
that when consumers get a perceived bargain, they do not look
back at the pricing history of an item to see if they were misled.
Such a deception might be difficult to detect—and personal
post-purchase research would be costly.
The above sweater marketing practice likely constitutes
lawful price discrimination. Urgent buyers who wish to pay the
higher price will do so sooner, while the less urgent will value
the offering at a lower point. They will transact later at a lower
price, perhaps as the “sweater season” passes. Advertising the
price in conjunction with a prior-reference price point might
seize the attention of bargain hunters, with whom the seller
would never transact, had the offer been at $28 the entire time,
64
(or perhaps even at $21.99). Most important, for the purpose
of deceptive pricing, the initial sweater price would constitute a
60. See 16 C.F.R. § 233.1(a).
61. Id. § 233.1(a), (c).
62. Id. § 233.1(a).
63. This absence of expectation, combined with the difficulty for consumers to obtain information to identify fictitious pricing, may in part explain the
low amount of complaints received by the FTC about retail outlet shopping. In
fact, the FTC’s response to Senator Blumenthal “for not launching an investigation” into retail outlet fictitious pricing was that “they [had not] received
enough consumer complaints about [the] issue.” Hladky, supra note 2. The
Senator labeled this response “ridiculous” and “ludicrous” because the FTC
has no set number of complaints required for initiating an investigation. Id.
64. See Armstrong & Chen, supra note 12, at 25.
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bona fide offer. Expectations of value would not be unduly manipulated and consumer search would retain integrity.
By using the reference point to establish a value baseline,
the retailer may be manipulating the consumer into a purchase, further exploiting the built-in behavioral biases that this
Article discusses in Part I.B. This manipulation might cause
consumers to overestimate product value, purchase something
that they might not have otherwise purchased, spend more on
an item than they might have, or even prematurely stop their
65
shopping before they found their best bargain.
Is the consumer truly harmed by offers referencing fictitious former prices, considering that the retailer ultimately offers the items at a definitive numeric price at the point of sale
and in the end, the consumer accepts the price? As this Article
discusses throughout, factors countervail, but in the end, overwhelming evidence exists that fictitious pricing reduces welfare. A starting point for assessment of fictitious-pricing enforcement begins with locating what makes the practice
powerful for advertisers, informed by basic behavioral economics.
B. BEHAVIORAL INFLUENCE ON CONSUMERS
“I don’t even get excited unless it’s 40% off.”
66
- Lourdes Torres, browsing the sales rack at Macy’s.
1. Anchoring Effects
“Anchoring” describes the human tendency to cast disproportionate weight on the first piece of information that they re67
ceive when making subsequent decisions. In this context, the
prior-reference price could be the first piece of information that
sets the course for subsequent transactional decisions. This
phenomenon might explain the import of “40%” to the aforementioned Ms. Torres.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky famously demonstrated that decision makers “evaluate outcomes” based on “ini68
tial reference point[s].” The anchoring of the sale price to a
65. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 887–88 (Cal.
2011).
66. Kapner, supra note 7.
67. Program on Negotiation, Anchoring Effect, HARV. L. SCH., http://www
.pon.harvard.edu/tag/anchoring-effect (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
68. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1535 (1998); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263
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“former price” makes the sale price more attractive than the
price would have been had it stood alone. Behavioral economist
Richard Thaler elaborated that if a “suggested reference price”
is offered, “a lower selling price will provide positive transac69
tion utility.” A higher fictitious “former price” disingenuously
causes the consumer to attach a higher level of value to an item
70
than it would have had the pricing been honest.
One meta-analysis of the power of anchoring in deceptive
prior-reference pricing concluded:
[A]n abundance of evidence . . . show[s] that advertised reference
prices (ARPs) influence a range of consumer price-related responses,
including increasing perceptions of the fair price, the normal price,
the lowest available price in the market, the potential savings and the
purchase value . . . . The effects of reference pricing on consumer deal
evaluations and behaviour have been replicated fairly consistent71
ly . . . .

Retailers can use discounting—genuine or fictitious—
powerfully to their advantage if they execute with precision. As
this Article discusses next, a high prior-reference price can manipulate transactions by signaling that an offer brings higher
value but at a lower price.
2. Price Effect on Perceived Quality
Consumers may also use a former reference price as a signal of quality, especially in markets where quality may prove
72
difficult to discern. If the price signal is genuine—i.e., the
good was once offered in a bona fide manner at a higher price,
the advertised discount communicates the availability of a true
bargain. Perhaps the benefit of waiting for seasonal clothing or
sporting goods to fade out of season, or the impending introduc(1979) (critiquing expected utility theory as descriptive model of decisionmaking and promoting prospect theory instead).
69. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 27
MARKETING SCI. 15, 24 (2008).
70. See Grewal & Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising, supra note
12, at 55.
71. Ahmetoglu et al., supra note 12; see also Donald R. Lichtenstein, Price
Perceptions, Merchant Incentives, and Consumer Welfare, 14 J. PROD. &
BRAND MGMT. 357, 358 (2005) (“ARPs work, a lot of research shows they do,
and retailer practice and returns shows that they do. This is nothing new—it
is widely known. If I advertise a sale price of, say, $29.95 and accompany it
with an ARP of, say $39.95, in most contexts, sales will increase relative to a
no ARP present situation. Sales will likely increase as I increase my ARP to
$49.95, to 59.95, to 69.95.”).
72. See generally Kyle Bagwell & Michael H. Riordan, High and Declining
Prices Signal Product Quality, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 224 (1991) (discussing signaling distortion’s relation to pricing).
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tion of a new model of an electronics item can be realized
through a discount. If the signal proves false, however, the consumer transacts on a false association of quality. If the advertiser never offered a sweater for a bona fide price of $100, the
consumer may be left with the impression that the sweater was
once tagged with $100 quality, and a moderate discount may
73
trigger the false notion that the seller is offering extra value.
In that scenario, a consumer purchase would be a mismatch of
payment and expected value, but it might be difficult for the
consumer to feel a loss without knowing that more shopping
could have yielded a better deal.
One well-known analysis describes how consumers link
price and quality in the context of the rollout of a new product:
Consider a market in which a firm introduces a new product possessing some innovative feature of uncertain quality. Some consumers
can ascertain the quality, while others cannot, but all understand
that a higher-quality product is more costly to produce. The most efficient way for the firm to signal high quality is to charge a price too
high to be profitable if the product were in fact of lower quality . . . . [U]ninformed consumers rationally infer higher quality from
74
the higher price.

This stylized analysis benefits from a few extensions. The
scenario fits best with new products but also fits with established product lines where consumers have difficulty discerning
quality and associated price values. Some offerings must be
evaluated post-purchase in order for consumers to judge quality.
In addition to exploiting the anchoring effect and perceived
quality, fictitious pricing also enables retailers to exploit consumer tendencies and biases in the valuation of bundles of
gains and losses. This Article further elaborates on that point
in its discussion of prospect theory.
3. Prospect Theory
The presentation of a discount price can lead consumers to
believe that they are receiving extra value because of the way
people cognitively assess gains and losses—especially when
gains are segregated and losses are bundled. At the core of prospect theory, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky demonstrate that for individuals, losses loom larger than gains of

73. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 12 (4th
ed. 2001) (discussing the “Drubek” anecdote, which describes a mistake but
invokes similar consumer psychology).
74. Id. at 224–25.
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75

equivalent magnitude. When losses are presented as a bundle,
however, the perceived total loss diminishes. Conversely, when
gains are segregated, the perception emerges on net that total
76
value is higher. The classic illustration of this phenomenon
comes from an example provided by Richard Thaler, involving a
lottery experiment. Subjects who win a lottery twice, (once for
$50, once for $25) tend to enjoy more satisfaction than those
77
who win the lottery once for $75.
How does discounting tap into prospect theory? A discount
offers the buyer segregated gains and a consolidated loss, enhancing the perceived value of the transaction. Consider three
scenarios for a necktie offering at an outlet store:
Tie offered without discount advertising for $100.
Tie offered for twenty-percent off with a price tag of $125.
($100 at register).
Tie offered for twenty-percent off with a price tag of $125
($100 at register), but ties were never sold at a bona fide price
of $125.
The first scenario offers the consumer one consolidated
gain (the tie) and one consolidated loss ($100 payment). The second and third scenarios keep the loss consolidated but segregate the gains. The consumer receives the tie (one gain), the
$25 “savings” (a second gain), and experiences one consolidated
loss ($100). Effectively, the consumer receives the same value
78
but enjoys an experience similar to winning the lottery twice.
If the third, “fictitious” presentation causes the transaction to
take place because it apparently maximizes utility, should its
fictitious nature matter to the consumer? Should regulators let
the consumer proceed in ignorance, enjoying the utility from
the two gains, or should they intervene?
These questions cut to one of the essences of the problem
with regulating fictitious pricing. Is there harm to the individual consumer? Framing the harm proves difficult. After all, the
consumer saw the tie, saw the final price offered at the cash
register, and transacted. Perhaps, post hoc, the consumer
would object to the transaction or claim that he would have
withheld expenditure. Nonetheless, the consumer might have
behaved differently but for the fictitious discount, perhaps con75. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 68, at 268.
76. See Thaler, supra note 69, at 18–24.
77. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 183, 187 (1999).
78. See id. Mental accounting proves nuanced. A payment is not necessarily a “loss,” for example. See id. at 188.
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tinuing to shop, perhaps transacting at a lower “loss” or price.
As this Article discusses in Part II, pleading individual pecuni79
ary harm has proven frustrating for private plaintiffs. The difficulty of demonstrating individual harm may lead to the conclusion that addressing the welfare problem may be left solely
in the hands of regulators.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF DEMONSTRATING INDIVIDUAL
CONSUMER HARM
Prior to 1969, in the heyday of FTC enforcement of fictitious pricing, the FTC almost exclusively focused on harm to
the “marketplace” rather than harm to individual consumers.
An emphasis on a broader injury to “competition” or “competition in commerce” may have reflected several dynamics. First,
the FTC’s statutory mandate emphasized regulation of commercial behavior over—but not to the exclusion of—redressing
individual injury. Second, the “unfair methods” and the “unfair
or deceptive acts or practices” may have been easier to prove
than injury. The simplest regulatory approach may have been
to enjoin the fictitious-pricing practices.
In Section A, through an exploration of FTC actions before
1969, this Article shows the regulatory approach toward addressing “marketplace harm” rather than individual harm—an
approach that warrants revisiting today. Interpretation of state
law offers another avenue for exploring the concept of individual harm. In Section B, this Article shows that Illinois law requires proof of consumer and competitive injury in order for a
private fictitious pricing claim to proceed. This barrier for private litigation in Illinois led Judge Frank Easterbrook to declare that such actions belonged in the province of an attorney
general. In Section C, this Article shows the recent evolution of
California law through Kwikset v. Superior Court and Hinojos
v. Kohl’s. California leans toward penalizing this tactic and enjoining advertisers from employing it.
A. HISTORIC APPROACH: MARKETPLACE INJURY
The FTC took action against fictitious pricing shortly after
80
the agency’s creation. In the 1920s, a decade noted for expan-

79. As Part III discusses, public regulators can have trouble matching an
appropriate remedy, too.
80. For a history of deceptive-pricing regulation from 1920 until 1962, as
well as a contemporary account of the state of regulation and the retail market
in 1962, see Harkrader, supra note 13.
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sion of mass production and the mass consumer market, retailers had already embarked on reference-price promotional
82
campaigns. The very first FTC Reporter reports cases where
the FTC deemed promotion of fictitious “sales” of vacuum
83
cleaners as an “unfair method of competition.” Two 1920 FTC
cases involving retail sales of pianos typify the nature of ac84
85
tions taken in that era. In Holland Piano Manufacturing Co.,
the FTC found that Holland Piano stenciled “high fictitious
prices on pianos . . . and allow[ed] radical reductions therefrom,” leaving purchasers with the impression that the pianos
86
were offered at reduced prices at retail. These “reduced prices”
suspiciously aligned with the “full resale prices received for pi87
anos of equal quality and grade” elsewhere. This scheme con88
stituted an “unfair method[] of competition.” The FTC unsuccessfully pursued similar claims that same year in FTC v. P.A.
Starck Piano Co., along with claims of false advertising with
89
respect to “special sales” and “economical shipping methods.”
Note that both actions invoked unfair competition, per the original FTC Act language, indicating that the FTC deemed such
practices impermissible in the marketplace. The FTC did not
consider the issue of individual consumer harm in these matters.
In the post-war era, the FTC pursued cases against both
90
manufacturers and retailers. For example, in Orloff Co., the
manufacturer, Orloff, shipped watches to retailers with price
tags affixed. The manufacturer tags displayed high prices, but
Orloff understood that the watches would be sold by retailers at
81. See generally Joseph A. Schumpeter, The American Economy in the
Interwar Period, the Decade of the Twenties, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1946) (discussing the utility of history for testing economic analysis).
82. See Harkrader, supra note 13, at 3.
83. Muenzen Specialty Co., 1 F.T.C. 30 (1920). Just before Muenzen Specialty, a candy manufacturer was found to engage in unfair competition by
falsely stating that it had priced its candy “below cost.” E.J. Brach & Sons, 1
F.T.C. 186 (1918).
84. The Federal Trade Commission Act established the FTC in 1914, replacing the Federal Bureau of Corporations, which had been established in
1903. See NAT’L ARCHIVES, GUIDE TO FED. RECORDS, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 122.1 (1976), http://www.archives.gov/research/guide
-fed-records/groups/122.html.
85. 3 F.T.C. 31 (1920).
86. FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 148
(1920).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 52 F.T.C. 709 (1956).
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91

substantially lower prices. The FTC found that Orloff “know92
ingly placed into the hands of retailers a means and instrumentality whereby members of the purchasing public may be
misled and deceived as to the usual and regular selling prices
93
of [Orloff’s] watches . . . .”
Orloff typified this era of fictitious-pricing enforcement,
linking consumer deception in fictitious pricing to substantial
94
injury to competitors and “competition in commerce.” Upon
promulgation of the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing in 1958,
nearly thirty percent of all FTC cease-and-desist orders were
95
attributable to “fictitious pricing.” Fictitious-pricing actions
emerged as the “leading type of deception practiced in violation
96
of the FTC Act.” The 1958 version of the Guides required actual sales of an item at the reference price, signaling a low tol97
erance for the practice. The FTC pursued actions more aggressively in this period than at any other time.
The fictitious-pricing scheme confronted by the FTC in
98
1964 in Crown Publishers provides another typical scenario.
Crown had been selling copies of a book to retailers with a price
mark of $6.00, while recommending to sellers that they in turn
99
mark down the book to $2.98. Crown knew that no retailer ev100
er sold copies of that book for $6.00. The FTC found that the
publisher had “the tendency and capacity to mislead and deceive [consumers] into believing that by purchasing the
book . . . at $2.98 or at any price less than $6.00, they [would
101
be] saving the difference between the lower price and $6.00.”
The FTC found Crown’s actions to be “all to the prejudice and
injury of the public and of respondents’ competitors and constitute unfair and deceptive acts and practices and unfair meth91. Id. at 711.
92. Id. at 715 (“It is absurd to suppose that [Orloff] would . . . engage
in the empty and financially wasteful practice of supplying retail price
tags to their customers if such tags were not being used by [retailers] to
advantage in the sale of [the] watches . . . . [Orloff] cannot therefore deny
their authorship of, or escape responsibility for, a device which to their
knowledge is being widely used for deceptive purposes.”).
93. Id. at 717.
94. Id. at 716.
95. Harkrader, supra note 13, at 4 n.10.
96. Id. at 3–4.
97. See Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 23 Fed. Reg. 7965, 7966 (Oct.
15, 1958).
98. Crown Publishers, Inc., 66 F.T.C. 1488 (1964).
99. Id. at 1489.
100. Id. at 1499.
101. Id. at 1517.
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102

ods of competition . . . .” Here, the FTC recognized the concept
of potential injury to consumers but focused on “competitive injury.”
These actions show how the FTC played the role of marketplace referee before 1969. The FTC aimed primarily to preserve integrity and fairness among competitors with only a secondary concern for consumer welfare. These enforcement
efforts foreshadowed the tenor of the 1983 Policy Statement on
Deception, which permits a finding of materiality without requiring evidence of tangible consumer harm. In Crown Publishers, the FTC indicated that consumer testimony about deception, though worthy of incorporating in the record, was not
required for determining whether a practice constitutes decep103
tion. The FTC had room to find deception, even without proof
of injury to consumers or competitors, though some finding of
both might support a case.
104
In Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, the Second Circuit did
not even require the FTC to prove that competitors demon105
strated an injury. The “inference that [a marketer] by its misleading initial approach attracted business which it would not
106
otherwise have obtained” was permissible. Again, in this era,
the FTC and the courts focused more on the nature of the activities, assuming a general harm to the marketplace. “The law is
violated if the first contact . . . is secured by deception . . . even
though the true facts are made known to the buyer before he
107
enters into the contract of purchase.” Under this approach,
102. Id. at 1516.
103. Id. at 1497 (“Actual consumer testimony is in fact not needed to support an inference of deception by the Commission.”).
104. 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961).
105. Exposition Press is a general deception case that addresses FTC
standards for proof of injury, which implicate deceptive discounting cases. Id.
In this case, the FTC “did not explicitly marshal evidence of the existence of
other [sellers] competing with [the target], the fact that there are such publishers emerges amply from a reading of the record as a whole.” Id. at 873.
106. Id. Actual proof that one actor injured another specific actor in a
crowded marketplace would resemble a burden of proof similar to private
claims brought under the Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2014);
see, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 583
(1986) (determining that price-•xing did not inflict injury and that claimant
actually stood to gain from the higher market prices); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort
of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118–19 (1986) (rejecting a lost-pro•ts claim based
on lower market prices resulting from a merger which may have caused injury
because the resulting lower prices were not anti-competitive).
107. Exposition Press, 295 F.2d at 873 (quoting Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC,
186 F.2d 821, 824 (7th Cir. 1951)); see also Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc. v.
FTC, 202 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953); Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103
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even if the buyer discovers that an item was fictitiously priced
before buying it, the absence of pure “benefit-of-the-bargain”
damages did not absolve the seller. Proof of injury to the public
interest took primacy in enforcement. Even if consumer harm
had not been proven, harm to the public could be found and
remedied by the FTC.
However, after the FTC ceased enforcement, most private
litigants, often using a class action mechanism, did have to
show pecuniary injury. The abandonment of fictitious pricing
emerged from a host of sweeping changes at the FTC in 1969. A
“wild and wooly group of students known as ‘Nader’s Raiders’”
berated the FTC for focusing on trivial abuses at the expense of
108
more serious fraud. The Raiders criticized the Commission
for “lethargy among the legal staff, political favoritism, inept
109
management, and a poorly functioning monitoring system.”
Though the Raiders’ critique was not the first sharp critique of
the FTC, nor was the critique itself novel, unlike previous studies, “[i]t sparked a series of political actions that eventually re110
vitalized the agency.”
The Nader Report spurred President Nixon to ask the
American Bar Association (ABA) to study reform of the FTC
111
and make recommendations. In the 1969 ABA Report, Richard Posner concluded that deceptive-pricing enforcement wast112
ed resources. The other committee members did not disagree.
Posner concluded that the more than five million dollars that
the FTC “expended in the area of fraudulent and unfair marketing practices” in the 1963 fiscal year “bought precious little
113
consumer protection.”
After President Nixon received the 1969 ABA Report, he
charged the FTC “‘to initiate a new era of vigorous action’ to
114
“Sound economic analysis” would
protect the consumer.”
prove central to setting priorities for the Bureau of Consumer
(7th Cir. 1946).
108. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 44, § 8:2.
109. Id.
110. Cox, supra note 26 (quoting HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 26). Cox, the
author of the article, was a “Raider.” Id. at 899.
111. See 1969 ABA REPORT, supra note 26; Letter from President Richard
Nixon to William T. Gossett, supra note 26. See generally MARTIN, supra note
26 (“[The ABA’s conclusions were] remarkably similar to the conclusions of
Nader’s Raiders . . . .”).
112. See 1969 ABA REPORT, supra note 26, at 61–82.
113. Id. at 77.
114. Cox, supra note 26, at 906 (quoting HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 26,
at 166).
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Protection, a newly established FTC division. FTC fictitiouspricing enforcement ceased contemporaneously with this reorganization.
The states continued to see activity, including from private
actors enforcing state consumer statutes. In Sections B and C,
this Article discusses the approaches of Illinois and California,
respectively, in addressing private fictitious-pricing claims. Illinois law appears to close the door to private consumer litigants. California leaves the door open but offers scant guidance
on remedies.
B. PRIVATE LITIGATION AND INDIVIDUAL HARM
Recent private fictitious-pricing cases litigated under Illinois and California law show the challenge of demonstrating
116
economic harm. Applying Illinois law, a federal district court
declined to find a remedy for a private plaintiff claiming harm
117
from fictitious-pricing deception. Nonetheless, a transaction
borne in deception might inflict some consumer harm in some
cases. In one private consumer action under California law, the
Ninth Circuit focused on problems inherent in the underlying
deception, building a case for discerning actual economic harm
without offering a satisfactory theory for framing pecuniary
damages.
Private actors attempting to sue retailers under deceptivepricing statutes can have difficulty pleading a theory of damages. Where statutory damages are unavailable, implicitly, economic or “actual” damages must be proven by private parties,
118
or at least alleged, in the class action context.
This degree of difficulty may explain why there are few reported cases where private consumer fictitious-pricing actions
have been brought. Nonetheless, the facts of these modern cases illustrate the nature of the harm, and this Article explores
them here.
1. Illinois Approach
Courts have recently confronted private fictitious-pricing
115. Id.
116. This Article defers discussion of public state enforcement approaches
until Part III.
117. See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the Illinois statute and case
law.
118. See Kim v. Carter’s Inc., 598 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A private
party, however, must show ‘actual damage’ in order to maintain an action under the ICFA.”); see also 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10a (2007).
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actions brought under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Decep119
tive Business Practices Act (ICFA). In Camasta v. Jos. A
120
Bank Clothiers, Inc., the plaintiff consumer claimed that the
clothing retailer Jos. A. Bank Clothiers (JABC) advertised
“sales prices” which induced him to buy six shirts at one of the
121
retailer’s stores. The consumer alleged that he later discovered that the price he paid was not the product of a “temporary
price reduction,” but rather the result of “a sales practice of advertising the normal retail price as a temporary price reduction
122
at all of its 31 retail locations in Illinois.”
The Camasta plaintiff claimed that had he known that the
advertised “sale” price was actually the regular price, he “would
not have been induced to purchase [the shirts], could have purchased [the shirts] for less than the amount paid, or could have
gone to another retail store for a true ‘sale’ price of a comparable item, or shopped around and obtained a better price in the
123
marketplace.” This plaintiff struggled to demonstrate a pecuniary injury. If the plaintiff knew the price at the point-of-sale,
had the opportunity to walk away, and still engaged in the exchange, was there harm? The Camasta court found none, draw124
ing upon prior appellate interpretations of ICFA.
125
126
In Kim v. Carter’s Inc. and Mulligan v. QVC, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit and Illinois Court of Appeals, respectively,
found similar complaints bereft of claims for contractual dam127
ages (i.e., deprivation of the “benefit of the bargain”). For example, in Kim, the plaintiff claimed that Carter’s sold t-shirts
128
at a thirty-percent discount off a fictitious “suggested price.”
The Seventh Circuit again held that there was no pecuniary
harm to the consumer if an item was sold at a discount from a
fictitious price, because the actual price offered and accepted at
129
the ultimate point of sale served as the contractual price.
Therefore, no tangible, identifiable economic damages had been
inflicted. In Mulligan, for similar reasons, the Illinois appellate
court found that even if seller QVC (a television marketing
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. 505/1–/12.
No. 12-C-7782 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2013).
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
598 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010).
888 N.E.2d 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
Kim, 598 F.3d at 365; Mulligan, 888 N.E.2d at 1196–97.
Kim, 598 F.3d at 363.
Id. at 365–66.
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channel) compared fictitious “actual retail prices” against QVC
130
prices, ICFA would not offer the plaintiff economic damages.
Without economic damages, the private mechanism does not
enable consumers to police the market in the courts.
Competitors can also make claims against other competitors for injuriously deceptive discount pricing. Sellers rarely
appear to pursue actions against rivals engaging in fictitious
pricing, probably because causation and damages are difficult
to prove. First, proving that competitive damage emanated
from one particular seller in a crowded marketplace presents a
challenge. Second, proving that price confusion was the proximate cause that led customers to switch a purchase to the
cheating competitor, also presents difficulty. These injuries are
not difficult to conceptualize—but they are quite difficult to
prove. The Restatement of Unfair Competition also notes the
difficulty of “establish[ing] a clear nexus” between fictitious
131
pricing and harm to a particular seller.
The only recent reported seller-against-seller dispute offers
an example of the difficulty of proving a “horizontal claim.” In
132
B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., a jewelry retailer brought an unsuccessful fictitious-pricing claim against a
133
competitor, based on the Illinois statute and the Lanham
134
Act. In B. Sanfield, a local, stand-alone jewelry store in Rockford, Illinois sued a retailer, Finlay Fine Jewelry, which oper135
ated within department stores at over 800 locations. Finlay
regularly sold its affordable wares at a declared fifty-percent
136
137
discount. This discount was “phony,” as the discounts were
130. Mulligan, 888 N.E.2d at 1196–98.
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST. 1995).
132. 999 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Ill. 1999), vacated, 168 F.3d 967 (7th Cir.
1999), remanded to 76 F. Supp. 2d 868 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff’d, 258 F.3d 578 (7th
Cir. 2001).
133. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 470.220 (1989).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (“Any person who . . . uses in commerce
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any
. . . false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature . . . of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”). The Seventh Circuit
ultimately consulted the FTC’s Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 16 C.F.R.
§ 233.1, for application of the Lanham Act. See B. Sanfield, Inc., 258 F.3d 578,
579–80 (7th Cir. 2001).
135. B. Sanfield, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1102, 1103–04 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
136. B. Sanfield, Inc., 258 F.3d at 579.
137. Id.
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rarely suspended, and few items were ever sold at the “onehundred percent” full reference price. Occasionally, “but never
on a Saturday or during December[,] Finlay remove[d] . . . ‘sale’
signs and [offered] items at higher prices, but less than 3 percent of its sales [were] made that way-and if a customer ask[ed]
for the 50 percent discount during regular-price days, Fin138
lay . . . happ[ily] obliged.”
The district court held that such practices “were not false
139
or even misleading because customers see through the ruse.”
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected this conclusion, noting
140
that the lower court had conflated injury with falsity. A practice need not injure in order to meet the falsity threshold, according to the appellate court, but injury would still need to be
141
demonstrated for relief. The Seventh Circuit vacated the original district court ruling for failing to make such a determina142
143
tion, and the district court subsequently found no injury.
On appeal once again, the district court’s finding of no injury
was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, defendant Finlay ulti144
mately prevailing.
Sanfield ultimately lost before the Seventh Circuit because
145
of the challenge of proving injury in a horizontal claim.
Sanfield first claimed that it had to pay for corrective advertising to inform consumers that they should focus on absolute
prices, not “phantom” prices, but it simply failed to establish
146
this fact before the district court. Sanfield also contended that
customers demanded fifty-percent markdowns to match Finlay,
and when Sanfield refused such demands, customers left the
147
The court found insufficient evidence to support a
store.
causal link between lost business and Finlay’s fictitious offers:
Many people who walk through Sanfield’s door would fish for discounts even if Finlay were to change its business methods . . . . [T]he
district judge sought . . . some evidence that Sanfield’s sales were influenced by Finlay’s practices. For example, did Sanfield’s sales rise
on weekdays, when Finlay was most likely to take down its “sale”
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967, 967 (7th
Cir. 1999).
143. B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 868,
874–75 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
144. B. Sanfield, Inc., 258 F.3d at 582.
145. Id. at 580–82.
146. Id. at 580–81.
147. Id. at 581.
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signs? The district judge observed that Sanfield’s sales rose during
the months covered by its claims and that attributing any particular
lost business to Finlay is difficult: “Finlay and Sanfield did not compete exclusively with each other; rather, there were numerous other
competitors for sales of the gold jewelry at issue.” If these other rivals
sold for less than Finlay, then they would be the likely source of di148
verted business . . . .

Private relief was not available, but the court indicated in
dicta that regulators would have had a much easier time proving a fictitious-pricing claim; they would not have had to
demonstrate injury to a seller or consumer. As Judge Easterbrook noted in his collective interpretation and review of the
Lanham Act, the FTC Guides, and Illinois law, “if the FTC or
the Attorney General of Illinois were to bring an action . . . the
court would issue an injunction in a trice. But . . . the plaintiff . . . is not a public prosecutor. It is a jewelry store, one of
[the defendant’s] rivals . . . and to prevail it must show inju149
ry.” His opinion concluded with a repetition of this point:
“[The plaintiff] fancies itself a private attorney general, but it
has not been appointed to that office, and as a private litigant
150
must show injury, which it did not.”
Judge Easterbrook begs the question—if Sanfield cannot
be a private attorney general, where is the public attorney general? Where is the FTC? The FTC would have an easier path to
put a stop to confusing fictitious-pricing behavior (in a “trice”),
had the matter been before it. As this Article discusses in Part
IV, the FTC justified discontinuing fictitious-pricing enforcement under the logic that larger, incumbent department stores
would urge the FTC to harass discounters. In this case, ironically, a local single-store retailer brought a complaint against
151
an 800-location seller operating out of department stores. In
152
Sanfield conflict, Bambi
this “Bambi-Meets-Godzilla”-like
cannot prove injury under Illinois law, despite Godzilla’s attack. Only the regulators, according to Judge Easterbrook, can
insulate Bambi from deceptive tactics. These activities could be
much more easily ended by the FTC, which has the power to focus on marketplace behavior, rather than prove actual injury.
The complexity and difficulty of these Illinois private ac-

148. Id. (internal citations omitted).
149. Id. at 580.
150. Id. at 582.
151. B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1102, 1104
(N.D. Ill. 1998).
152. See Marv Newland, Bambi Meets Godzilla, YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2006),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BXCUBVS4kfQ.
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tions, consumer and seller, demonstrate that private actions
will not police fictitious pricing. Regulators are best situated to
153
do so, and the FTC can set that tone at the federal level by
moving away from zero enforcement. California offers a more
open avenue for private claims, but direct consumer remedies
may still prove elusive.
2. California Approach
California consumer law can have an outsized impact on
154
California’s fictitious-pricing
national commercial norms.
regulatory regime, a product of legislation, voter referendum
and case law, differs from Illinois in its approach toward discerning an injury. California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL)
affords civil remedies to consumers who suffer injury from “un155
lawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s].” Af156
ter California voters approved Proposition 64 in 2004, revising the standing threshold for private actors in suits under the
157
UCL, and by reference, California’s False Advertising Law
158
(FAL), a question arose about the nature of the injury that
would need to be demonstrated for a private UCL suit to pro159
ceed.
153. As noted in the Introduction, state action does not effectively address
fictitious pricing. Paul Rubin argues that state regulation of advertising is less
competent than federal regulation and is politically-driven while also understaffed. He also expresses concerns that multiple overlapping regulators might
“lead to more restriction of advertising than is appropriate.” Paul H. Rubin,
Information Regulation (Including Regulation of Advertising), in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 271, 274 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De
Geest eds., 2000).
154. California’s gross domestic product (GDP) was $2 trillion in 2011, constituting thirteen percent of the nation’s output. The California economy
equates to that of the ninth largest country in the world. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, 2013 CAL FACTS (2013), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/
calfacts/calfacts_010213.aspx#Californias_Economy.
155. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2015). Also of note, local prosecutors have the authority to bring UCL actions. See Order of Final Judgment,
California v. Southdale Kay-Bee Toy Inc. (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 2003) (No. 2615784); Jay Goetting, Toy Story: Napa To Get $200,000 in Lawsuit, NAPA VALLEY REG. (Aug. 20, 2003), http://napavalleyregister.com/news/toy-story-napa
-to-get-in-lawsuit/article_61d89f98-a858-5fe6-af0d-8f26459414e7.html.
156. TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS 109–10 (2004), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/
2004/general/propositions/prop64text.pdf.
157. Limiting standing to any person “who has suffered injury in fact and
has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.” Id.
158. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500–17509 (West 2015); Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003) (stating
that the UCL can “borrow[] violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices”).
159. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 881–82 (Cal.
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In Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme
Court addressed the question of what a consumer would have
to allege to show an “economic injury from unfair competi160
tion.” Though this case is not a private case, nor is it a fictitious-pricing case, the arguments lay a foundation for private
fictitious-pricing litigation. The Court noted that there were
“innumerable ways” for a consumer to show injury from unfair
competition, such as:
(1) surrender[ing] in a transaction more, or acquir[ing] in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have;
(2) hav[ing] a present or future property interest diminished;
(3) be[ing] deprived of money or property to which he or she has a
cognizable claim; or
(4) be[ing] required to enter into a transaction, costing money or
161
property, that would otherwise have been unnecessary.

Kwikset did not address fictitious pricing, but rather a de162
ceptive “origin of the goods” claim. The plaintiff’s claim resulted from being misled about the origin of goods he purchased
from Kwikset—locksets advertised as “Made in the U.S.A.” that
163
contained components manufactured overseas. The plaintiffs
alleged that before transacting, they “saw and read [Kwikset’s]
misrepresentations [about origin,] . . . relied on such misrepresentations in deciding to purchase . . . [the locksets] . . . and
would not have purchased them if they had not been so misrep164
resented.” The false-origin claim caused the plaintiffs to buy
products that they did not want causing them to “spend and
lose . . . [the] money . . . paid for the locksets,” thereby “suf165
fer[ing] injury and loss of money.”
The Kwikset court, though discussing origin and not pricing, boiled down the problem: “Simply stated: labels matter.
The marketing industry is based on the premise that labels
matter [and] that consumers will choose one product over an166
This logic
other similar product based on its label . . . .”
should support an argument that price labeling “matters,” and
that price labeling tries to achieve the same goal of persuading
consumers to choose one product over a similar one:
For each consumer who relies on the truth and accuracy of a label and
2011).
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 885.
Id. at 885–86.
Id. at 882–83.
Id. at 881–82.
Id. at 883.
Id.
Id. at 889.
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is deceived by misrepresentations into making a purchase, the economic harm is the same: the consumer has purchased a product that
he or she paid more for than he or she otherwise might have been
willing to pay if the product had been labeled accurately. This economic harm—the loss of real dollars from a consumer’s pocket—is the
same whether or not a court might objectively view the products as
167
functionally equivalent.

The analogy of an origin case to a deceptive pricing case is
imperfect. A price is not a description of the goods. As the
Kwikset court notes, wine labeled “Kosher” loses all value to the
Kosher-observant consumer who discovers later that the wine
168
origin is not Kosher. With price, a moment of transactional
reckoning comes at the cash register or on the checkout page of
a website. The retailer presents the actual price at that moment and the consumer transacts at that price. The question is
whether the presented actual price, if fictitious, caused economic harm to the consumer. A disgruntled Kohl’s customer, armed
with the Kwikset decision, received an affirmative response to
that question from the Ninth Circuit, sharply contrasting with
the Illinois outcome.
In Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., the plaintiff alleged a fictitiouspricing claim against retailer Kohl’s, claiming that he purchased luggage and clothing items that were either routinely
sold at the advertised “sale” price, or that the “advertised . . .
‘regular’ prices did not reflect prevailing retail market prices
during the three months immediately preceding [their] publica169
tion.” Hinojos rounded out his complaint pleading “that he
‘would not have purchased [these] products at Kohl’s in the ab170
sence of Kohl’s misrepresentations.’” In his opinion, Judge
Stephen Reinhardt opened with a diatribe about fictitious pricing:
Most consumers have . . . purchased merchandise that was marketed
as . . . “on sale” because the proffered discount seemed too good to
pass up. Retailers, well aware of consumers’ susceptibility to a bargain . . . have an incentive to lie to their customers by falsely claiming
that their products have previously sold at a far higher “original”
price . . . to induce customers to purchase merchandise at a purport-

167. Id. at 890.
168. Id. at 889. For an argument for honoring consumer preferences with
respect to the processes behind a product rather than the mere qualities of the
product per se, see Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 526, 526 (2004) (examining the conceptual distinction between “processrelated information” and “product-related information”).
169. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013). The issue
presented was whether the plaintiff had standing. Id. at 1103.
170. Id. at 1102.

950

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:921

edly marked-down “sale” price. Because such practices are mislead171
ing—and effective—the California legislature . . . prohibited them.

Judge Reinhardt accurately observed that the California
legislature specifically addressed the marketing behavior that
Hinojos alleged. The California FAL provides a crisp rule regarding unfair advertising with respect to former-price compar172
isons :
No price shall be advertised as a former price of any advertised thing,
unless the alleged former price was the prevailing market price . . .
within three months next immediately preceding the publication of
the advertisement or unless the date when the alleged former price
173
did prevail is . . . stated in the advertisement.

The California standard for establishing the reference price
is much less forgiving than the FTC Guides. The former price
must be the prevailing market price, not an actual former price
offered under some vague standard of good faith. If not, the retailer must actually declare with precision when the former
price was offered. If enforced, the standard could provide consumers with greater confidence in the discounts that they observe—and retailers with concrete guidance about discount
promotion. But risks associated with discount promotion might
cause advertisers to shy away from such campaigns, which may
reduce competition.
That aside, the California standard for establishing individual harm stands apart from Illinois. The facts of Hinojos
matched the Kwikset requirements for recognizing an economic
174
injury, thus establishing standing for the plaintiff. Judge
Reinhardt concluded that “price advertisements matter” in con175
sumer decision making and more specifically, “‘regular’ or
‘original’ price [advertisements matter,] provid[ing] important
176
information about the product’s worth and . . . prestige.” Citing marketing scholarship, Judge Reinhardt noted that discounts “created an impression of savings . . . enhancing . . . willingness to buy the product,” while prematurely stopping the
177
consumer’s search for a lower price. Reference-price misin171. Id. at 1101.
172. In turn, unfair advertising equates to unfair competition under the
UCL. Id. at 1103.
173. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17501 (West 2015).
174. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107; cf. Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246
P.3d 877, 892–95 (Cal. 2011) (applying the requirements of the UCL and concluding that the plaintiff had standing).
175. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107.
176. Id. at 1106.
177. Id. (citing Grewal & Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising, supra
note 12, at 55).

2016]

RECONSIDERING FICTITIOUS PRICING

951

formation would matter to consumers in the same way that any
178
false label would. Kwikset analogized that selling a falselylabeled Rolex watch would inflict harm on consumers, even if
179
the watch functioned and looked exactly like a Rolex.
Judge Reinhardt contended that fictitious pricing could inflict even more injury than the deceptive-origin claim in
Kwikset. “The deceived bargain hunter suffers a more obvious
economic injury as a result of false advertising . . . because the
bargain hunter’s expectations about the product he just purchased is precisely that it has a higher perceived value and
180
therefore has a higher resale value.”
Further, the Hinojos court pointedly rejected the defendant’s argument, accepted in Illinois, that the plaintiff received
the “benefit of the bargain,” noting that the price-reference
181
misrepresentation at issue was “material.” Judge Reinhardt
referenced common-law definitions of materiality, but also noted that the deceptive-pricing prohibition made the misrepre182
sentation per se material. Hinojos’ allegations “that Kohl’s
made material misrepresentations [inducing] him to buy products he would not otherwise have purchased” were sufficient to
183
support the standing requirements for economic injury.
Though the Kwikset and Hinojos cases proffer the notion
that a fictitious-pricing plaintiff can formulate a sufficient injury claim to support standing, how to calculate that remedy remains unclear. The remedy may be material, but after departure from benefit-of-the-bargain theory, theorizing damages
proves difficult. Though Judge Reinhardt locates private
harm—harm that can be avoided not just through private enforcement, but also through public enforcement—the magnitude of that harm could prove difficult to measure. Hinojos does
not explicitly solve the harm-measurement puzzle completely
cast aside by Illinois law, but it raises the Kwikset questions
that should weigh in the calculation of the benefits of renewed
enforcement.
III. THE WELFARE IMPACT OF FICTITIOUS PRICING
A strong consensus supports the finding that fictitious pricing interferes with markets, yields inefficiency, and reduces
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id. (citing Kwikset, 246 P.3d at 890).
Id.
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id.
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welfare. However, regulators need to exercise precision in combatting fictitious pricing to ensure that price competition would
not be truly diminished. There is a role for regulation and enforcement, even though none is happening on the federal level
now. Even the harshest critics of fictitious-pricing enforcement
concede that some scenarios are severe enough to warrant
184
prosecution.
In Section A, this Article discusses the welfare-driven arguments offered against enforcement by Robert Pitofsky. In
Section B, this Article counters the arguments in Section A
with conclusions from the body of economic and marketing literature that overwhelmingly show that fictitious pricing distorts competition and diminishes welfare. Finally, in Section C,
this Article examines the approaches taken by the New York
Attorney General in two settlement decrees, and by a California court in People v. Overstock.com. These approaches point
toward the proper, welfare-maximizing approach, while avoiding the problem of demonstrating individual injury.
A. WELFARE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENFORCEMENT
Robert Pitofsky’s arguments for ceasing FTC enforcement
185
186
warrant notice. His 1977 Harvard Law Review article provided the deepest publicly available insight into the rationale
behind enforcement discontinuation. Pitofsky offered a rigorous
framework for justifying regulatory intervention, identifying
factors that would indicate an advertising-driven “market fail187
ure.” In sum, Pitofsky expressed certainty that retail markets, if left unfettered, would fail to consistently produce sufficient and accurate information about quality—and price. Yet,
184. See Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 62–63 (advancing multiple arguments for why it is unwise policy to prosecute fictitious pricing “except
in the most extreme and egregious circumstances”).
185. Pitofsky has been described as a “Founding Father” of the “modern
FTC.” Muris, supra note 19. In addition to working in academia, Pitofsky authored the historic 1969 ABA Report, headed the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer
Protection, and served as FTC Commissioner and Chairman. Id.
186. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, supra note 20.
187. Id. at 663–66. From reading Pitofsky’s article, it is possible to discern
characteristics that suggest a market failure. They include (1) where consumers have difficulty tracking and comparing the variety of constantly changing
offers and pricing information; (2) when competition does not always provide
accurate information about price and quality—and “rivals . . . rarely . . .
challeng[e] . . . questionable claims”; (3) when markets have limited competition due to market structure, leading to low-information advertising on price
and quality; (4) when the cost of information provision proves too high when
the consumer market remains small; and (5) where sellers have better use for
their advertising budget than rebutting claims of rivals. Id.
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Pitofsky rejected the notion that enforcing fictitious-pricing
regulation would produce a net benefit for consumers.
Pitofsky shared at length his well-developed views of the
aims of advertising regulation. He linked consumer access to
188
“truthful data” with “effective competition in the market,” observing that access to truthful advertising facilitates price
189
comparison. False advertising, he recognized, can lead to
“misallocation of economic resources . . . by diverting trade to
high priced premium products that differ from cheaper substi190
tutes only in the quality and volume of advertising.” Pitofsky
noted that “where product claims are viewed with utter suspicion, high price is adopted as an indication of quality, and price
191
competition . . . become[s] economically irrational.”
Though these observations should raise concerns about fictitious pricing, Pitofsky believed consumers could fend for
themselves on this front. Consumer protection from false advertising, he maintained:
should not be a broad, theoretical effort to achieve Truth, but rather a
practical enterprise . . . . [W]here consumers are fully capable,
through common sense or simple observation, of protecting their interests against advertising exaggerations or distortions, there would
192
be no reason for the law to intervene.

Fictitious-pricing enforcement may “achieve Truth,” but
Pitofsky asks, at what cost? Would enforcement enhance, preserve, or harm price competition? Are consumers capable of
“protecting their interests” through “simple observation” in this
193
194
context? Pitofsky viewed enforcement as unjustifiable. Even
in an era of renewed advertising regulation efforts, he questioned allocating resources toward pursuit of fictitious-pricing
195
claims.
Pitofsky acknowledged that fictitious-pricing tactics could
inflict “competitive or consumer injuries” by misdirecting buyers “from the more efficient low-price seller, [causing execution
of purchases] . . . that might not otherwise occur” or occur at
196
that time. He conceded that consumers might be deprived of
188. Id. at 671.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 687–88 (arguing that fictitious pricing enforcement is unnecessary and costly).
195. Id.
196. Id. Armstrong and Chen more recently raised concern about this dy-
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the “benefits of the bargain they thought they were receiv197
ing.”
Ultimately, however, Pitofsky dismissed the significance of
fictitious pricing, labeling the tactics “innocuous.” He assumed
that price-comparison shopping would be frictionless, or that
consumers would dismiss aggressive discount claims as puff198
ery. Pitofsky contended that if “consumers [were] accurately
informed of the offering price, they [could] make sensible deci199
sions.” This contention assumed away a fundamental problem—the “offering price” has not been “accurately informed” if
the associated reference price providing context proves fictitious—and the earlier discussion of the role of behavioral economics explains why.
Pitofsky expressed structural concerns about the role of
discount pricing in retail markets, particularly that fictitiouspricing enforcement would derail retail “discounters,” key driv200
ers of competition. Enforcement would deter discounter market entry and disproportionately burden existing discounters.
Pitofsky warned that incumbent “nondiscounters” would regularly report discounters to the FTC, using regulation as a
201
He summarized his argument that enforcement
weapon.
would disrupt price competition:
Aggressive enforcement against discounters that forces them to hew
close to the line of accurate information may tend to dampen competitive activity. Often . . . discount promotions . . . assist new entrants in
penetrating concentrated markets . . . . [T]he cost . . . of ascertaining
whether particular discount claims are accurate may deter [sellers]
202
from making such claims at all.

Pitofsky’s position on fictitious pricing has proven durable.
203
In 1991, Timothy Muris echoed the 1977 logic at length.
namic. See generally Armstrong & Chen, supra note 12, at 25 (describing economic models of consumer responses to discounted prices, and concluding,
“[b]ecause of their incentive to mislead customers, in some—but not all—of the
situations we discuss, there is a potential role for policy to prevent sellers advertising false discounts”).
197. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, supra note 20, at 688 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 687–88 (arguing that “unlikely” claims such as “lowest price ever” or ambiguous discounts “will be ignored by almost all customers”).
199. Id. at 688.
200. See id.
201. Id. Perhaps the observations about favor for high-quality incumbents
in the wood, fur, and textiles industries, noted by Posner, and referenced in
the 1969 ABA Report, explains this view. See 1969 ABA REPORT, supra note
26, at 34.
202. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, supra note 20, at 688.
203. See Timothy J. Muris, Economics and Consumer Protection, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 103, 111–16 (1991).
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Muris also cited the 1989 Report of the ABA Antitrust Section
Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade
Commission (1989 Report) for the premise that excessive regu204
lation of price advertising could ultimately injure consumers.
The 1989 Report concluded that “[e]xcessive regulation of pricing claims can harm consumers, as experts on advertising have
205
come to appreciate.” The sole expert expressly cited in the
206
1989 Report was Pitofsky.
In 2004, Pitofsky reiterated his criticisms of fictitiouspricing enforcement, with special emphasis on state-level en207
forcement activity. Concerned about the “varied landscape of
state laws,” he suggested that states should repeal their consumer-protection statutes relating to fictitious pricing and only
pursue enforcement in the “most extreme and egregious cir208
cumstances.” Since 1969, “extreme and egregious” fictitiouspricing circumstances may have presented themselves somewhere, but the FTC has not pursued a single seller during that
period. Pitofsky repeated verbatim his 1977 concerns about the
social and economic costs of enforcement, the “dampen[ing] of
competitive activity” from having to “hew close to the line of accurate information,” and the anti-competitive effects that would
209
result from potential deterrence of discount claims.
With the retail environment of the 1970s long gone,
Pitofsky expressed the very same concerns about fictitiouspricing regulation in 2004, maintaining that “the FTC . . . made
the judgment, correctly . . . that the chilling effect of deceptive
pricing regulation on retailers, and the inherent subjectivity
and difficulty in ascertaining compliance, have brought about
210
more harm than good.” Pitofsky observed that informed consumers had better evaluative tools in 2004 for making price
comparisons, noting the newfound ability to check prices with

204. Id. at 112.
205. ABA, REPORT OF THE ABA ANTITRUST SECTION SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO STUDY THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 37 (1989) (emphasis
added). The 1989 Report offered a straw-man argument in defense of nonenforcement. As an illustration of the horribles that could result from enforcement, the Report offered the hypothetical of regulators “prohibiting ‘sales’
featuring less than 10 percent price reductions” and warning that such a regulation “could increase price rigidity.” Id. The Guides never deemed such a practice deceptive, and the FTC never contemplated considering such a reduction.
206. See id.
207. Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 62–63.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 63 (citing Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, supra note 20).
210. Id.
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211

retailers like Amazon.com and e-Bay.
Over time, as noted, private and state actions surfaced offering facts that could meet Pitofsky’s “extreme and egregious”
212
criteria for FTC enforcement. These cases provide grounds for
specific opportunities for intervention, but more recent evidence emphatically supports a broader policy that includes enforcement. In Section B, this Article reassesses the value of enforcement, reviewing the literature that has emerged to
support the premise that fictitious pricing interferes with markets and reduces welfare.
B. WELFARE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING ENFORCEMENT
Decades of marketing research have revealed the distortions that fictitious pricing can inflict on the market. The literature has, in fact, played a role in prominent recent fictitiouspricing litigation. In Hinojos, Judge Reinhardt expressed concern that fictitious pricing would stop a consumer from continuing to search for a truly lower price, citing a 1992 Dhruv
213
Grewal and Larry D. Compeau literature survey as support.
In Overstock.com, the court, in ordering the company to comply
with fictitious-pricing regulation, also gave weight to 1998 and
214
2004 analyses by Grewal and Compeau. Nonetheless, the
backdrop of advertising regulation reveals that intervention
must be done with caution to avoid harming the procompetitive effects of advertising. This Article explores that
backdrop in Subsection 1. In Subsection 2, this Article describes the rich body of work that makes the fictitious-pricing
211. Id. at 64.
212. See cases cited supra note 15 and accompanying text.
213. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing
Grewal & Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising, supra note 12, at 55 (recommending closer policymaker scrutiny of prior-reference pricing practices,
based on a survey of twenty-eight separate studies of former-price comparisons and closely related practices)).
214. People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RG10546833, 2014 WL 657516, at
*12–13 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2014). The Overstock.com case is presumably
referencing Larry D. Compeau & Dhruv Grewal, Comparative Price Advertising: An Integrative Review, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 257, 257 (1998)
[hereinafter, Compeau & Grewal, An Integrative Review] (summarizing twenty
years of analyses, concluding that comparative price advertising is effective,
“with a strong opportunity for deception, requir[ing] careful management and
monitoring”), and Larry D. Compeau et al., Consumers’ Interpretations of the
Semantic Phrases Found in Reference Price Advertisements, 38 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 178 (2004) (concluding that pricing claims related to regular versus sales
prices “may be . . . informative or deceptive depending on the meaning that the
consumer attaches to the claim,” much like other findings in consumer research).
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arena an exception worthy of consideration for more regulatory
scrutiny and enforcement.
1. Concerns About Regulatory Pricing Intervention
Advertising plays a critical role in signaling and market
competition. Regulators should be generally reticent to impede
advertising by correcting every flaw and imperfection. But
where a deceptive activity is both common and injurious to welfare, the reticence should be eschewed in favor of vigilance. Before this Article discusses empirical evidence supporting the
reassessment of regulatory intervention with fictitious pricing,
this Article first addresses the general concerns about regulatory interference with retail-pricing disclosure.
Regulators have reason to exercise caution when interven215
ing in regulating or restricting retail-price disclosure. As
Howard Beales et al. observed, mandating the withholding of
information from the market can “inhibit competition, with
216
consequent efficiency losses.” According to another analysis,
“the prices of goods and services in places that restrict advertising tend to be higher than those in places that do not restrict
217
advertising.” Beginning in the 1970s, evidence emerged supporting the notion that fewer restrictions on general advertising leads to lower prices. Deregulation of price disclosure in
professions, notably optometry, provided an opportunity for
218
comparative cross-state studies confirming this conclusion.
One other analysis from this era observed the downward im219
pact on pharmaceutical pricing from price advertising. More
recently, studies of the impact of permitting price disclosure on

215. See generally REBECCA TUSHNET & ERIC GOLDMAN, ADVERTISING &
MARKETING LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 23–25 (2d ed. 2014); David Adam
Friedman, Debiasing Advertising: Balancing Risk, Hope, and Social Welfare,
19 J.L. & POL’Y 539, 608–09 (2011).
216. Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 514 (1981).
217. Zeynep K. Hansen & Marc T. Law, The Political Economy of Truth-inAdvertising Regulation During the Progressive Era, 51 J.L. & ECON. 251, 255
(2008).
218. See, e.g., Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337, 351–52 (1972); Lee Benham & Alexandra
Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspective on Information
Control, 18 J.L. & ECON. 421, 427 (1975); John E. Kwoka, Jr., Advertising and
the Price and Quality of Optometric Services, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 211, 211
(1984).
219. John F. Cady, An Estimate of the Price Effects of Restrictions on Drug
Price Advertising, 14 ECON. INQUIRY 493, 493 (1976).
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220

the price of alcoholic beverages and permitting more general
221
advertising for breakfast cereals have revealed that lower
222
prices result.
As Beales et al. identified, carving out areas where regulators would be prudent to pursue “information remedies” related
to deceptive advertising proves challenging in light of the pattern that less regulation seems to translate to more price com223
petition. The authors categorize “information remedies” in
markets as “(a) removing restraints on information; (b) correcting misleading information; and (c) encouraging additional in224
formation.” Regulators would face the task of intervention,
and as Beales and his coauthors observed, “remedying deficiencies in the information market is in some ways a more complex
225
and subtle task than regulating product markets directly.”
With respect to fictitious pricing, regulators face the challenge
of “correcting misleading information” and “encouraging additional information,” while not unduly restraining infor226
mation. The costs of compliance and risks of penalties should
not be so burdensome as to prevent price competition.
Advertisers, however, may have turned a long-accepted observation about the nature of false advertising inside-out. In
the 1970s, Phillip Nelson divided offering attributes into
227
“search,” “experience,” and “credence” characteristics.
“Search” characteristics, (e.g., product size, shape, product category, and price) were deemed easier for consumers to verify
and therefore of less concern for regulators. “Experience” characteristics presented more concern, as they were more difficult
for consumers to observe and verify, like quality and nature of
220. Jeffrey Milyo & Joel Waldfogel, The Effect of Price Advertising on
Prices: Evidence in the Wake of 44 Liquormart, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1081, 1095
(1999) (discussing that lower prices result in certain circumstances).
221. C. Robert Clark, Advertising Restrictions and Competition in the Children’s Breakfast Cereal Industry, 50 J.L. & ECON. 757, 759–60 (2007).
222. The results, however, are not always unambiguous. See WILLIAM W.
JACOBS ET AL., FTC, IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES: THE
CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING 123–27 (1984)
(finding that while “in almost every case,” attorneys who used advertising
charged lower prices than attorneys who did not, “personal injury attorneys
who advertised” charged about 3% more than personal injury attorneys who
did not).
223. Beales et al., supra note 216, at 513.
224. Id. at 514.
225. Id.
226. See Friedman, supra note 215, at 569 n.99.
227. See, e.g., Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON.
729, 730 (1974); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J.
POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970).
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the item, until purchased, though consumers might be less like228
ly to give such claims credibility.
As Lillian BeVier posited, “incentives to falsify . . . advertisements should be understood as a function either of consumers’ ability to verify claims prepurchase or of consumers’ disin229
clination to believe self-interested claims.” BeVier contended
that consumers had the power to retaliate against deceptive
advertisers, and that “withhold[ing] repeat purchases” and
negative word-of-mouth would work as “weapons” to deter dis230
honest advertisement. She did not overextend this claim, concluding that “[w]hen this reality is fed into the calculus, the
dimensions of the problem of deceptive advertising for experi231
ence qualities continue to shrink.”
The nature of fictitious pricing does not fit well with the
Nelson model for two major reasons. First, consumers duped by
fictitious pricing may not detect the “duping” as readily as they
might a deficiency in advertised quality. Second, as Roger
232
Schechter responded directly to BeVier, once induced to try a
product, consumers tend to continue purchasing a brand “until
233
some external source brings [a] falsehood to [their] attention.”
Having tried the brand, the consumer “may become ‘hooked’ on
234
the objective features of the [product].” In other words, advertisers may successfully use falsehoods—or fictitious pricing—to
235
induce an initial experience. After the initial experience the
inclination to shop further, on price or other attributes, may
diminish; the gathering of incremental shopping information
may appear to the consumer to have decreasing returns.
Generally, the research into the effects of fictitious pricing
emphasizes the power of the practice to stop consumer search—
and the accompanying welfare impact. The harms that
Schechter points out may be real—a misleading practice like
fictitious pricing could hook a consumer on an item for the long
term. But the individual harm would prove difficult to measure. To the extent that all advertising changes preferences, fic228. For a discussion of Nelson’s work and subsequent critiques, see Lillian
R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (1992).
229. Id. at 8.
230. Id. at 11.
231. Id. at 12.
232. See Roger E. Schechter, Additional Pieces of the Deception Puzzle:
Some Reactions to Professor BeVier, 78 VA. L. REV. 57, 71 (1991).
233. Id. at 72.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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titious pricing, by inducing a consumer to transact and commit
to a product, may have the same effect. However, as this Article
discusses next, the welfare effects of fictitious pricing have consistently been found to be significant.
2. Evidence Supporting Fictitious-Pricing Intervention
Price remains a basic search characteristic, but the incentives to manipulate the role of pricing in “search” are high if the
prior-reference price stunts the search process. Verification of a
false prior-reference price might prove logistically challenging—and those who verify and truly seek the lowest price either have significant expectations of financial savings from continued shopping or a low self-imputed value to their time.
The low likelihood that a consumer will notice individual
harm from this type of falsity makes fictitious pricing tempting
for advertisers. Compared with individual consumers, regulators can more readily identify the practice. The charge of the
FTC, as well as the legal regime in states like California, enables prosecution of the practice under the notion of a general
harm to welfare, without worry of proving individual harm.
One analysis of an adjacent problem proves informative. In
1990, Ian Ayres and F. Clayton Miller predicted that if automobile price-markup information became more available and
accurate, shoppers would not need to shop as much to ensure
236
that they were getting the right deal. Ayres and Miller observed that accurate disclosure of “[m]arkup information
[could] . . . serve as a dramatic substitute for consumer
237
search.” The power of accurate markup information speaks to
the power of inaccurate markdown information. Fictitious pricing provides a dramatic, misleading substitute for consumer
search—one less likely to lead the consumer to the lowest price.
Mark Armstrong and Yongmin Chen provided the most recent economic analysis of discount pricing, including fictitious
238
pricing. They concluded that, “[b]ecause of their incentive to
mislead customers, in some . . . situations . . . there is a potential role for policy to prevent sellers advertising false discounts . . . . In most cases, the overall impact on welfare of a
236. Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, “I’ll Sell It to You at Cost”: Legal Methods To Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1048
(1990).
237. Id.
238. See generally Armstrong & Cheng, supra note 12 (investigating discount pricing and discussing some reasons why a discounted price can make a
rational consumer more willing to purchase an item).
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policy which combats false discounting is positive.”
Integrating a description of underlying behavioral con240
cepts, Armstrong and Chen identified two ways that discounts (truthful and otherwise), as opposed to the plain presentation of a low price, can drive purchasing propensity among
rational consumers. “First, the information that the product
was initially sold at a high price may indicate the product is
high quality. Second, a discounted price can indicate that the
product is an unusual bargain, and that there is little point
241
searching for alternative, lower prices.” As they noted, a fictitious price can prematurely discourage search—the search
might stop because the pricing signal wrongfully deceived the
242
consumer into stopping the search. If consumers are tricked
into ceasing a search for true lower prices, true price competition will likely be displaced as a means for competing for consumer attention.
The analysis shows that “false discounts discourage consumers from investigating rival offers[,] . . . depriv[ing] rivals of
[the] opportunity to compete effectively. In these settings, preventing [fictitious pricing] can lead to more effective competi243
tion.” Because honest discounters might have fewer items on
sale at any given time, dishonest sellers prevail in the market,
244
exacerbating the price-competition problem. The authors ultimately concluded that “[i]n most cases, the overall impact on
welfare of a policy which combats false discounting is posi245
tive.” They prescribed a renewed enforcement policy with
caution, however, and with less conviction than their analytical
contribution. Armstrong and Chen conceded that no benefit can
be realized without some measure of enforcement, but they de246
clined to recommend a required enforcement level.

The authors concluded that:
Sellers have a strong motive to make their customers feel they are
getting a special deal, and they have myriad ways to achieve this. It is
unrealistic and undesirable to suppose that regulation can address all
forms of false discounting without unduly restricting a seller’s mar239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 1–5.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 25–26.
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keting abilities, and regulators should focus only on flagrant exam247
ples of deception.

This conclusion fits neatly with Pitofsky’s proposed “ex248
treme and egregious” threshold for taking action, a threshold
that appears to exist in theory only.
Previous studies comported with Armstrong and Chen’s
conclusions, but they supported the welfare argument with
more certainty. The 1998 Compeau and Grewal study left “little
doubt that comparative price advertisements work,” finding
that “the [overall] potential for deception seem[ed] rife because
external reference prices have a strong influence on consumers,
249
The 1992 Grewal and
even when they are exaggerated.”
Compeau meta-analysis remains the most thorough survey of
the prior-reference-pricing literature, analyzing twenty-eight
250
empirical studies.
Grewal and Compeau extracted two notable consensus con251
clusions. The first set of conclusions showed empirical support for the notion that a “reference price create[s the] impression of savings” and that “the presence of a higher reference
price enhances subjects’ perceived value and willingness to buy
252
the product.” Further, the evidence demonstrates that “[i]f
the reference price is not truthful, a consumer may be encour253
aged to purchase as a result of a false sense of value.”
The second set of conclusions indicated that “as discount
size increases, consumers’ perceptions of value and their willingness to buy the product increase, while their intention to
254
search for a lower price decreases.” This implied that larger
discounts associated with fictitious pricing “mislead the con255
sumer and reduce search.” Grewal and Compeau concluded
with a compelling set of recommendations to policymakers,
most of them urging a more aggressive enforcement approach
256
toward fictitious pricing.
In sum, prior-reference pricing influences consumers, and
247.
248.
249.
250.
55.
251.
. . . .”).
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 26.
See Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 62–63.
Compeau & Grewal, An Integrative Review, supra note 214, at 263.
Grewal & Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising, supra note 12, at
Id. (“Four key public policy implications of these studies are discussed
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 58–59.
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fictitious prior-reference pricing disrupts retail markets in two
primary ways. First, the practice misleads consumers with a
signal that distorts perception of product quality. This signaling can lead to one distorted transaction or, as Schechter indi257
cated, a series of transactions following the initial commitment. Second, the practice distorts the very essence of price
competition. Consumers rely upon a prior-reference price and
associated discount as a measure of savings. Confronted with
potential savings, consumers are more likely to stop their
searching for a better value—whether that value is better quality, a lower price for the same quality, a different good entirely,
or ultimately, a decision not to transact.
The approach taken by regulators in New York and by the
258
Superior Court in the California Overstock.com case bypasses
the difficulty in discerning individual consumer harm. Because
of state statutes, some regulators and courts have found a middle path in addressing this problem. Bypassing the knot of discerning consumer harm, as this Article shows in three examples in Section C, regulators and courts have ultimately favored
civil fines, penalties, and injunctive relief directed at punishing
and stopping the market-disrupting, fictitious-pricing behavior.
Given the difficulties of discerning consumer remedies, this approach presents the clearest path to resolving this problem—an
approach that the FTC should restore in measured fashion.
C. MODELS FOR A WELFARE-ENHANCING APPROACH
Models for welfare-enhancing enforcement can be found in
a few high-profile instances of state-level public prosecution.
259
State attorneys general have pursued a few fictitious-pricing
cases resulting in settlements that effectively prioritize addressing broader welfare harm over private, individual harm.
The remedies in the People v. Overstock.com judicial opinion re260
flect the same pattern. These state-level actions offer insight
into a potential model for enforcement—one where the regulators stop the market-distorting behavior through penalties and
injunctions, but avoid attempting to impose thornier individual
remedies.

257. See Schechter, supra note 232.
258. People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RG104546833, 2014 WL 657516
(Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2014).
259. And their equivalents.
260. See Overstock.com, 2014 WL 657516, at *35–39.
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1. State-Level Settlements
State-level fictitious-pricing regulation, though sporadic,
has proven successful enough to warrant attention from en261
forcement critics. A few recent consent agreements show that
individual harm has been moved aside in favor of general civil
penalties and injunctive relief. For example, in 2011, the New
York Attorney General reached a settlement with Michaels
Stores, an arts-and-crafts retailer, over fictitious-pricing prac262
tices. Michaels Stores had been engaging in “never-ending”
sales—continuously advertising services at a prior-reference
percentage (or absolute dollar) discount, meaning that the pri263
or-reference point was not the regular price for those items.
New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman offered
a nominal justification for enforcement rooted in rhetoric that
the company hurt individual consumers by roping them into
perceived deals: “For years, Michaels duped consumers into
thinking they were receiving huge discounts, when in fact, they
were simply paying the regular store price . . . . Through deceptive advertising practices, this company violated the law and
took advantage of hardworking consumers trying to save mon264
ey.” The New York Attorney General, however, did not ultimately require redress for individual harm or any form of restitution. Instead, the parties agreed that Michaels would pay
$800,000 in civil penalties and give $1 million worth of arts265
and-crafts supplies to public schools. In essence, the penalty
was punitive (and perhaps politically agreeable for both parties) but not restorative to consumers. Also, the agreement enjoined Michaels from continuing to engage in fictitious prior266
reference pricing and related practices.
Likewise, in 2004, Schneiderman’s predecessor Eliot
Spitzer reached an agreement with Jos. A. Bank Clothiers
267
(JABC) over fictitious pricing. The settlement references allegations that, in 2003, less than one percent of JABC’s suits,
formal wear, trousers, and blazers were offered at the regular

261. See Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 64–65.
262. See Assurance of Discontinuance, Michaels, supra note 16.
263. Id. at 2–3.
264. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney Gen., N.Y., A.G.
Schneiderman Secures $1.8 Million from Michaels Stores for Misleading Consumers (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman
-secures-18-million-michaels-stores-misleading-consumers.
265. Assurance of Discontinuance, Michaels, supra note 16.
266. Id. at 5–7.
267. See Assurance of Discontinuance, Jos. A. Bank, supra note 16.
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268

price, and only ten percent of dress shirts. The Attorney General further alleged that merchandise was “perpetually ‘on
sale,’” noting that JABC’s three best-selling items, the Signature, Executive, and Trio suits were on sale during all of 2003
269
with the exception of a few days.
This settlement required JABC to pay $425,000 in civil
270
penalties and $50,000 in costs to New York State. More onerous than the one-time civil penalty, JABC agreed to comply not
only with New York’s false advertising laws, but also with the
FTC Guides—16 C.F.R. § 233.1 (former price comparisons) and
271
with all of 16 C.F.R. § 233 (deceptive pricing). Ironically, New
York State compelled JABC to comply with FTC Guides that
the FTC does not enforce.
In both of these settlements, New York modeled potential
future enforcement actions. Foremost, the state stopped the retailers from engaging in a market-distortive practice that
stunts consumer shopping, causes misperceptions of value, and
ultimately reduces welfare. The retailers paid a public penalty
for untoward market behavior that affected overall welfare,
and state avoided intellectual contortions by eschewing the individual remedy.
2. A Judicial Approach
“No one, in history, has ever been asked to do this or [was]
272
sued for not doing it.”
- Patrick Byrne, CEO of Overstock, demonstrating
273
unawareness of past and recent history, subsequent to
a ruling ordering the company to comply with California
discounting regulations.
The reasoning of People v. Overstock.com provides an overlay for policymakers and those with discretion to bring fictitious-pricing cases. In Overstock.com, the People’s complaint af268. Id. at 2.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 6.
271. Id. at 5.
272. Cade Metz, Court Decision Could Change Rules for Online Price Comparisons, WIRED (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/overstock-price
-ruling.
273. See supra text accompanying note 15 (listing active actions as of December 2014); see also Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013)
(finding for plaintiffs in a case very similar to Overstock.com); supra Part
III.C.2 (discussing the New York State Attorney General settlement decrees
with JAB and Michaels).
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forded an opportunity for a California Superior Court to expound upon the various elements of a fictitious-pricing action
and explore appropriate remedies and sanctions. This case reveals a compelling logic for why private actions fail, and why
public actions, appropriately reined in, provide the best avenue
for addressing welfare damage from fictitious pricing.
The remedy imposed by a California court in Overstock.com
offers guidance for how today’s FTC enforcement regime should
work. The Overstock.com case ultimately did not squarely turn
274
on an “internal” prior-reference advertising claim; the case
turned on Overstock allegedly creating false list prices for the
275
purpose of discounting. The court found that the company
based list prices off estimates from formulas or off the prices of
276
different items. “Every time Overstock displayed a list price
based on a formula or a similar product rather than [the manufacturer’s established list price] it made an untrue state277
ment.”
278
The eight California district attorneys prosecuting this
case alleged that Overstock traded on false representations of
279
discounting practices. Broadly, the court focused on Overstock’s practice of labeling and displaying “advertised reference
prices” (ARPs) as “intend[ing] to convey to consumers that
Overstock was a discounter and [that] very substantial savings
280
could be enjoyed by purchasing from its site.” Of concern to
the People, in light of literature’s consensus about the competitive harm from search stunting, was Overstock’s claim: “[W]e
281
compare prices so you don’t have to.” Ironically, the court
found that “compare” labels were not false, per se, because they
282
merely called on the consumer “to do something.”
Examining that slogan in conjunction with the false list
274. See People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RG104546833, 2014 WL
657516, at *32–33 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2014).
275. Id. at *27.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See id. at *1. In California, district attorneys and city attorneys can
play a role in enforcement. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17508, subd. (b)
(West 2015). For other notable examples, see California v. Southdale Kay-Bee
Toy, Inc., No. 26-15784, 2003 WL 25284541 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2003);
Goetting, supra note 155.
279. Overstock.com, 2014 WL 657516, at *1 (“At the beginning, most if not
all of Overstock’s offerings were products from manufacturers, retailers or jobbers who were liquidating excess or outdated inventory . . . .”).
280. Id. at *3.
281. Id. at *2.
282. Id. at *27.
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prices, however, the advertiser appeared to count on some degree of search stunting, emphasizing that the consumer should
be confident in believing that pricing had been thoroughly vetted. Generally, “the People contend[ed] [that] Overstock used
labels, formats[,] and practices that resulted in advertising
[methods] that [were] often false or at least misleading” under
283
California statutes, rendering them actionable.
The court’s remedy analysis confronted Overstock with
significant sanctions and penalties that would, if upheld, lead
to changes in the company’s marketing practices. In enjoining
fictitious-pricing behavior and levying penalties while declining
to award individual relief, the outcome of Overstock.com resembled the two resolutions reached by the New York State At284
torney General.
Foremost, the injunctive relief granted to the People was
285
significant in scope. This flavor of injunctive relief echoes the
remedies sought by the FTC prior to 1969. For example, Overstock was prohibited from “set[ting] . . . ARP[s] on any basis
other than an actual price offered in the marketplace at . . . the
286
time the advertisement is first placed.” Also, Overstock could
no longer select “the highest price that may be found anywhere” as a reference price, unless Overstock disclosed the con287
text of the discount.
The People unsuccessfully prayed for restitution for individual consumers misled by the deceptive pricing. The People
contended that “restitution should be the money that ‘may have
288
Specifically, the
been acquired’ by the false advertising.”
plaintiffs suggested that all California consumers who purchased items from Overstock over the previous ten years should
be given the choice to return the item for a refund or receive a
289
“5% credit towards future purchases.”
The Overstock.com court viewed the pursuit of individual
290
restitution as “wildly excessive” and “unjustified.” Evidence
failed to support a claim that all Overstock purchasers were de291
ceived. The People failed to present credible evidence about
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at *3.
See supra Part III.C.
See Overstock.com, 2014 WL 657516, at *34–36.
Id. at *35.
Id.
Id. at *36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pecuniary harm, and the court found the five-percent credit ar292
bitrary. The court concluded that the extensive record in the
case did not offer a “reasonable metric . . . [or] methodology” for
determining restitution and “identifying . . . who should receive
293
it.” This struggle with remedy and injury echoes that of the
private actions brought in Illinois, discussed earlier. Regulators
should take a cue from this opinion and the New York settlements and avoid the thicket of individual remedy—and instead
focus on stopping the general social harm. The Overstock.com
court focused on the latter.
The court acknowledged that “the most powerful evidence . . . [was] that there was a reduction in search intentions,
an increase in a perception of transaction value and a greater
294
likelihood that the consumers would return to [Overstock].”
Recognizing market distortion, the court turned next to civil
295
penalties.
The court evaluated the “seriousness of [Overstock’s] mis296
297
conduct” as “moderate.” But considering willfulness and
Overstock’s financial strength, the court imposed a $6,828,000
298
penalty. The court deemed this amount “the minimum neces299
sary to vindicate the purposes of the statutes.” In “vindicating” the statutes—while avoiding the thicket of individual
harm—the court attempted to preserve the integrity of signals
in the marketplace.
Even if higher courts alter this ruling, or if this matter
reaches a settlement during the appellate process, the logic of
the Overstock.com opinion has appeal particularly with respect
to remedies. The Overstock.com tack could easily apply to priorreference pricing, just as it did for external comparative reference pricing. The individual harms inflicted are difficult to
identify, but fictitious-pricing behavior can be spotted more
easily by regulators who track pricing than by individual consumers. The social harm can be addressed by civil penalties
which serve as a deterrent, if not a true recovery mechanism.
Future market distortion can be prevented with injunctive orders like the one in Overstock.com or stipulated agreements
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See id.
Id.
Id. Compeau presented this evidence as an expert at trial. Id.
Id.
Id. at *38.
Id. at *39.
Id. at *38–39.
Id. at *39.
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like those reached by the New York Attorney General in JABC
and Michaels Stores. The focus of enforcement should rest on
pinpointing social harms (like those identified in the literature), penalizing the infliction of harm, and preventing future
harm—while staying out of the minefield of proving individual
pecuniary harm.
Overstock attempted to mislead consumers and interfere
with consumer decision making by manipulating price advertising. As Judge Easterbrook wrote in B. Sanfield, an attorney
general would have been able to make a case about deception in
“a trice,” though the plaintiff in that case could not masquerade
as a private attorney general in search of damages that could
300
not be proven. Here, Judge Easterbrook’s public attorney
general materialized. The California approach, extending from
private actions in Kwikset to Hinojos to the public action in
Overstock.com, should serve as models for enforcement of ficti301
tious pricing. In Part IV, this Article suggests that the FTC
should revisit fictitious pricing, and this Article provides categorical examples of where the FTC might exercise discretion in
enforcement.
IV. THE CASE FOR REVISITING ENFORCEMENT
The time for reassessing the viability of enforcement has
arrived, especially given the FTC’s plans for review of the
302
Guides Against Deceptive Pricing in 2017. The welfare benefits of fictitious-pricing enforcement should outweigh the costs,
including costs of incremental enforcement, regulatory opportunity costs, and retailer compliance costs. Though the role of
cost-benefit analysis is not entirely uniform across zones of
303
regulation, the FTC has effectively adopted this approach,
which this Article describes next in Section A. In Section B, this
Article describes the temporal context of the original justifica300. B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 258 F.3d 578, 580 (7th
Cir. 2001).
301. Though Pitofsky disfavors all enforcement, this Article agrees with
him that if enforcement is left only to states, the patchwork of regulation and
varied compliance requirements could be messy. Institutionally, the FTC
might be best positioned to address practices of regional and national retailers.
302. See Modified 10-Year Regulatory Review Schedule, 79 Fed. Reg.
14199, 14200 (Mar. 13, 2014).
303. The consensus about applying cost-benefit analysis varies across regulatory subject matter. See Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis
for Financial Regulation, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (2013). See generally
MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (2006) (giving an overview the history of cost-benefit analysis).
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tion for nonenforcement and present the changes in retail markets since that time. The promotion of price competition by protecting “discounters” may have been paramount in 1977, but
the structure of the industry is quite different today. In Section
C, this Article offers some potential frameworks that the FTC
could use for prioritizing opportunities for enforcement while
recognizing the potential costs of enforcement.
A. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND FTC POLICY
Understanding the FTC approach toward enforcing fictitious pricing requires context about enforcement of unfair and
304
deceptive practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC
Act declares unlawful, “[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
305
or affecting commerce.” Though advertising practices can be
regulated either through “unfairness” or “deception,” the FTC
has prosecuted most advertising cases through the “deception”
306
standard.
The FTC’s application of “deception” proves central to understanding the approach to all federal advertising regulation,
307
“deceptive pricing” included. In 1983, a divided FTC adopted
308
in response to a
the “Policy Statement on Deception”
congressional inquiry. The 1983 Policy Statement listed three
309
elements that “undergird all deception cases.” First, “there

304. For a brief overview, see Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Remarks at the Economics of Digital Consumer Protection: One
Commissioner’s View 3–7 (July 31, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/573061/010731techfreedom.pdf.
305. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
306. Though the “disjunctive phrase ‘unfair or deceptive’ suggests that the
FTC can pursue advertisers on unfairness per se, the FTC has not taken that
path, opting for the deception angle.” SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 44; see also
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 44 (providing an overview of the FTC’s application of the deception standard to deceptive pricing (including bait and
switch) as well as unsubstantiated advertising claims, visual deception, unfounded testimonials and endorsements, misleading comparative advertising,
deceptive claims for tobacco products, misleading environmental advertising,
and deceptive “made in the U.S.A.” claims). The FTC also prosecutes deceptive
pricing under Section 12 of the FTC Act, but this section is targeted at advertising of food, drugs, devices, services, and cosmetics. 15 U.S.C. § 52(a)(2)
(2012).
307. Cf. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 44, §§ 11:1–5 (explaining the
role of “deception” in some FTC prosecutions).
308. FTC Policy Statement on Deception, James C. Miller III, Chairman,
Fed. Trade Comm’n (Oct. 14, 1983) (appended to Cliffdale Associates, 103
F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984)).
309. Id.
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must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer.” Such practices have been found to in310
clude “misleading price claims.” Second, the practice at issue
must be examined from the standpoint of a “consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances,” and third, the “representation, practice, or omission” at issue in the first prong must be
311
“material.” If it is likely that the consumer would have “chosen differently but for the deception,” “consumer injury” is like312
ly, and materiality is established. In some cases, materiality
can be presumed, though other cases may require presentation
313
of evidence.
This deception standard can reach fictitious pricing if the
FTC chooses to apply it. False information that misleads a reasonably acting consumer into making a different transactional
decision would constitute “deception.” Materiality, however,
may not be “presumed” in the case of deceptive pricing because
it does not fit into specific presumptive categories defined by
314
the 1983 Policy Statement. Nonetheless, materiality can still
be proven with evidence “that the claim or omission is likely to
be considered important by consumers.” A showing “that the
product . . . with the feature represented costs more than an
otherwise comparable product without the feature, a reliable
survey of consumers, or credible testimony” can serve as the
315
required evidence. The Policy Statement concludes:
A finding of materiality is also a finding that injury is likely to exist
because of the representation, omission, sales practice, or marketing
technique. Injury to consumers can take many forms. Injury exists if
consumers would have chosen differently but for the deception. If different choices are likely, the claim is material, and injury is likely as
well. Thus, injury and materiality are different names for the same
316
concept.

This last catch-all paragraph, combined with the express
mention of “misleading price claims,” captures the notion that
fictitious pricing would lead to material injury under these
standards. The FTC can choose to bring a case under the prem310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Among the “presumptively material” categories are claims generally
related to non-price attributes of the offering. See id. Also considered material
are claims involving health and safety and claims concerning the purpose,
safety, efficacy, cost, durability, performance, warranties, or quality of the offering. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. (emphasis added).
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ise that a deception that leads consumers to different choices
equates to a “likely” injury. Courts typically require consumer
plaintiffs to prove actual harm.
The FTC certainly would be within the bounds of statutory
authority and its own policy statements and guides, were it to
proceed with renewed enforcement.
B. CHANGING RETAIL MARKETS
The fundamental assumptions underlying the cost-benefit
decision to discontinue enforcement should be revisited.
Pitofsky argued that shielding retail discounters from enforcement would free them to offer competitive prices and discounts
317
However, diswithout worry of regulatory harassment.
318
counters thrived during the era of post-war enforcement,
which would indicate that they never really required protection.
Any notion that discounters were healthy during enforcement
alleviates concerns that enforcement would undermine their
role in price competition. Even if this concern about discounters
was well founded in 1969, retailing has changed so drastically
since then, that these changes should, at minimum, warrant
reassessment of the cost-benefit analysis of enforcement.
1. Post-World-War-II Retail Dynamic
In 1962, prominent industry lawyer Carleton Harkrader
observed that in spite of aggressive fictitious-pricing enforcement, discount retailers flourished after World War II, grabbing market share from traditional retailers like urban down320
town department stores. Ascribing the peak of enforcement to
the emergence of a “retail revolution” of discounters,
321
322
Harkrader described an environment in which they thrived.
Before World War II, department stores dominated their terri-

317. See Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17, at 63–64.
318. See Harkrader, supra note 13, at 4–5.
320. See id. at 4–6. Harkrader served as an attorney for the FTC before
founding a prominent Washington, D.C. law firm in 1960. See T. Rees Shapiro,
Robert L. Wald, Antitrust Lawyer Helped Found Fast-Growing District Firm,
Dies, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2010, at B4.
321. In his article, the only contemporaneous academic account of fictitious
pricing, Harkrader expressed concerns that one might attribute to an attorney
tied into the established retail and manufacturer industry. He argued that the
1958 Guides provided a “rough,” but “traversable,” road for retailers but expressed special concern for manufacturers who used pre-ticketed prices bearing exposure from retailers who would lower those prices. Harkrader, supra
note 13, at 27–28.
322. Id. at 4–6.
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tory. Department stores would typically mark up their merchandise at a standard forty percent above the wholesale price,
reflecting the manufacturers’ suggested retail price (MSRP), of323
fering different tiers of quality for each product category. In
this era, department stores provided higher levels of customer
service and competed with each other on service more than
324
price.
In the 1950s, a “new brand of merchandiser” arrived and
325
thrived—discounters, the entities that regulators would later
326
seek to protect from fictitious-pricing enforcement. These new
merchandisers “dispensed with expensive frills associated with
the traditional department store[s],” emphasizing a “low327
markup, high-volume, quick-turnover” approach. The emergence of discounters brought “unprecedented competition,” deploying a new business model that disrupted the establishment. Discounters emerged to serve a growing segment of post328
war consumers that valued low prices over service.
By minimizing operating expenses, discounters could afford to cut the forty-percent manufacturer markup in half and
329
remain profitable. Discounters enjoyed a relative cost advantage through implementation of self-service, moving to suburbs where the post-war consumers had migrated, and where
commercial real estate was less expensive and parking abun330
dant. In 1962, these new stores were occupying “buildings
331
that were often little more than warehouses.” This lower cost
structure enabled discounters to gain market share from department stores in part through “flamboyant” low-price adver332
tising.
In 1962, discounters certainly did not seem to need much
protection from competitors seeking regulatory help. They
transformed the landscape. Many established department
stores would fail as a result of these new players entering the

323. See id. at 4.
324. See id.
325. Id. at 4–5.
326. See generally Muris, supra note 19 (detailing Robert Pitofsky’s contributions to FTC regulations and consumer welfare); Pitofsky, Pricing Laws, supra note 17 (examining the history of FTC fictitious pricing regulations).
327. Harkrader, supra note 13, at 4.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 5.
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333

scene. Other incumbents modified their formats or strategically played the discount game, lowering prices on select items.
Thus began a “chain reaction of extravagant pricing claims by
334
both kinds of merchants, often abetted by inflated [MSRPs].”
These price battles went beyond plain offering or declaration of
335
lower prices, they involved referencing competitor prices.
With discounters flexing their structural pricing advantage, the incumbent, legacy retailers changed tactics. Department stores could not favorably compare their prices to the
discounters through direct comparison, so they pursued a different angle. According to Harkrader, the department stores—
not discounters—initiated the practice of advertising selected
336
sales that referenced a prior price or the MSRP. After department stores entered the discounting game, on many items,
the discounters had more difficulty winning through price com337
parison. Discounters responded by referencing their discounts
338
off the MSRP, too. Retailers of all stripes were compelled to
operate comparatively whether they preferred to or not. Prior339
reference discount pricing followed. The entry of discounters
transformed sleepy pre-war retail competition into the modern
era of perpetual discount-based competition. Discounters, even
in the early post-war era, did not merely enter and survive—
they sparked changes that led to the retail world of today.
After a decade, pricing presentation became indistinguish340
able between department stores and discount stores, “[i]n the
fierce competitive in-fighting for the consumer dollar, fictitious
341
pricing has become a common vice of the [marketplace].”
Harkrader claimed that this dynamic left consumers “confused,
342
critical and skeptical,” contending that this sentiment drove
the “agitation” for regulatory intervention and reform, culmi343
nating with promulgation of the 1958 version of the Guides.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 27.
342. Id. at 6. For support, Harkrader cited an article in the popular national press, Phony Price-Cutting: Threat to Advertising Confidence, TIME, Nov.
10, 1958, at 78, that in turn cited a Duquesne University study about consumer suspicions about discounting. Harkrader, supra note 13, at 6 n.18.
343. Harkrader, supra note 13, at 6.
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2. Post-1969 Retail Dynamic
The American retail sector transformed substantially since
344
the late 1960s, a factor ignored by Pitofsky and other enforcement critics. Focusing on just the largest industry players
does not tell the entire story of retail history, but changes at
the top can indicate significant changes in competition and industry structure. From 1970 through 1985, the leaders in the
345
non-supermarket, non-drugstore, retail sector remained fairly
stable. In 1970, Sears-Roebuck held the position of largest retailer, followed by J.C. Penney, Montgomery Ward, Kmart,
346
F.W. Woolworth, and Federated Department Stores. In 1975
and 1980, demonstrating remarkable stability, all of these entities remained on the list of the five largest retailers, except for
347
Montgomery Ward.
By the mid-1980s, the same players more or less held
ground, but this would change. From the list of top 1985 dis348
counters, only Walmart survived intact in 2014. These “origi344. For a discussion and illustration of these changes, see KPMG, THE
EVOLUTION OF RETAILING: REINVENTING THE CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE 1, 6–8
(2009), https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/
Documents/Evolution-retailing-o-200912.pdf.
345. Though supermarkets and drugstores comprise a significant part of
retail, this Article wishes to focus this analysis on changes in purchasing that
tend to be more discretionary.
346. See The 50 Largest Retailing Companies, FORTUNE, May 1971, at 196.
347. See The 50 Largest Retailing Companies, FORTUNE, July 1976, at 210;
The 50 Largest Retailing Companies, FORTUNE, July 1981, at 122.
348. See Kapner, supra note 7; Wenti Xu, The Market Structure of the U.S.
Retail Industry 1984–2003, at 116 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University). “Kmart” as it is known today, has been through
merger and restructuring. See Kmart History: Retailing Legend Is Born, SEARS
HOLDINGS, http://searsholdings.com/about/kmart/kmart-history (last visited
Nov. 24, 2015). Woolworth closed its last U.S. stores in 1997. “Woolworth was
100 years ago what Walmart is today.” Jennifer Steinhauer, Woolworth Gives
up on the Five-and-Dime, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1997, at A1. As part of its 1990
emergence from bankruptcy, Ames Department Stores shut down the last remaining Zayres stores. Stanley Ziemba, Ames Cuts To Wipe Out Ex-Zayres,
CHI. TRIB. (June 9, 1999), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-06-09/news/
9002170054_1_ames-department-stores-zayre-ames-shoppers. Ames itself
would completely succumb in 2002. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, Ames Discount
Chain To Close, CBS NEWS (Aug. 14, 2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/ames-discount-chain-to-close. Rapid American spun off Lerner Stores to
The Limited in 1985, and its other stores, McCrory and J.J. Newberry would
all shut down. See Amy Worden, Cashing out Last of Five-and-Dimes
McCrory’s Will Shut Its Doors Next Week in Harrisburg, as the Lone Remaining Original Variety-Store Chain Fades away, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Mar. 13, 2002), http://articles.philly.com/2002-03-13/news/25341228_1_
mccrory-buxbaum-group-paul-buxbaum; Nancy Yoshishara, Rapid American
Agrees To Sell 796 Stores: Limited Plans To Buy Lerner Chain, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 5, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-02-05/business/fi-4964_1_
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nal” discounters fell victim to the “category killers” (or “big-box”
retailers) arriving next, providing low pricing and superior
merchandising through a narrower focus around product category. Broad-merchandising discounters like Sears and Kmart
faced aggressive price competition from focused retailers like
Toys “R” Us, the Home Depot, Barnes & Noble, Staples, the
Sports Authority, Petco, and Best Buy. Warehouse clubs, like
Costco, Price Club, and Sam’s Club (Walmart’s preemptive
move into the warehouse arena), also began to chip away, not
349
only at supermarkets but other retailers.
By 2011, these second-wave discounters, the “category killers,” found themselves in an accelerating competitive struggle
with online competition, that some predict might end in a “tsu350
nami wave.” After years of riding out (and joining in) online
disruption of brick-and-mortar retail markets, the pre-2008 recession investment in physical locations by incumbent retailers
put them at a significant cost and flexibility disadvantage to
351
pure online retailers. Book stores, electronic stores, and of352
fice-supply retailers all absorbed hits from online retailers.
By 2012, the top grossing non-supermarket, non-drug re353
tailers in the United States were Walmart, Target, Costco,
mccrory. Shoe Corporation of America (SCOA) eventually merged with Hills
Department Stores. Both entities are now defunct. See Isadore Barmash, Hills
Department Stores Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1991,
at D2; Company Overview of Shoe Corporation of America, Inc., BLOOMBERG,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp (last
visited Nov. 24, 2015). Rose’s Stores, a regional chain of over 100 stores, was
purchased in a restructuring by Variety Wholesalers Incorporated. About Us:
About Variety Wholesalers, VARIETY WHOLESALERS INC., http://www.vwstores
.com/page/show/id/6528 (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
349. ROBERT SPECTOR, CATEGORY KILLERS: THE RETAIL REVOLUTION AND
ITS IMPACT ON CONSUMER CULTURE 31–51 (2005).
350. Rajiv Lal & Jose B. Alvarez, Retailing Revolution: Category Killers on
the Brink, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Oct. 10, 2011), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6813
.html.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. This Article includes Walmart (which includes Sam’s Club), even
though 55% of Walmart’s United States sales originate in grocery (Walmart is
America’s largest grocer). See WALMART, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2013),
http://stock.walmart.com/files/doc_financials/2013/Annual/2013-annual-report
-for-walmart-stores-inc_130221024708579502.pdf. The remaining non-grocery
segment of Walmart’s business is large enough that any discussion of the
American retail landscape must include it. This Article includes Target because only 20% of its 2012 sales were attributable to groceries and pet supplies. Approximately 55% of sales were attributable to apparel, hardlines
(electronics included), and home furnishings. See TARGET, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 64 (2013), https://corporate.target.com/annual-reports/pdf-viewer-2013?
cover=6725&parts=6724-6726-6727-6730-6728.
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the Home Depot, Lowe’s, Amazon.com, Best Buy, Sears, Macy’s,
354
and Apple Stores/iTunes. Pitofsky offered his rationale for
discontinuing enforcement in 1977. In 1977, with the exception
of restructured versions of Sears and Macy’s, these top 2012 re355
tailers had low national profiles, or were beyond conception,
356
let alone at the top of any list. By one account, the “traditional department store” had completely collapsed as an institution
357
by 2013.
354. See David P. Schulz, Top 100 Retailers, STORES MAG., July 2013. Note
that these stores mostly fall into big-box, discount, or online categories. Supermarkets and drugstores have proliferated on the larger list, as well.
355. In 1977, net Walmart sales were $479 million in 153 stores. Eric
Francis, Walmart at 50: A Not-So-Short History of the World’s Largest Retailer, ARK. BUS., July 2, 2012, at 12. By 2012, domestic Walmart sales were $328
billion. Schulz, supra note 354, at S7. In 1979, the Target store brand only existed in seventy-four stores in eleven states. Target Through the Years: 1979,
TARGET, https://corporate.target.com/about/history/Target-through-the-years
(last visited Nov. 24, 2015). Costco, an enormous warehouse discounter,
opened its doors under the name Price Club in 1976, and the first Costco labeled warehouse opened in 1983. Costco grew to $3 billion in sales in six years,
claiming a retail record. About Us, COSTCO, http://www.costco.com/about.html
(last visited Nov. 24, 2015). The Home Depot was founded in 1978. See Our
History, HOME DEPOT, https://corporate.homedepot.com/ourcompany/history/
pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
356. Although this Article has excluded food and drugstore chains from the
basic analysis, many, like Kroger, Walgreen, and CVS Caremark have also
emerged at the top of the overall list. See Schulz, supra note 354, at S7.
357. See Joe Weisenthal, You Might Not Have Realized Just How Much the
“Department Store” Has Collapsed, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www
.businessinsider.com/department-store-decline-2013-8. Indeed, department
store sales have steadily declined 29% from their most recent peak in January
2001 to February 2014. See Retail Trade: Department Stores (Excluding
Leased Departments), FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECON. RES. (Oct. 14,
2015), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/RSDSELD. In 1977, Pitofsky
expressed concern that “the usual complainants [about discounting practices]
have been nondiscounters who emphasize service and reliability rather than
price” at the expense of discounters who promote competition. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, supra note 20, at 688. The steep sales decline reveals traditional
players in the department store industry no longer have the same market
share or power. As this Article discusses infra, electronic retailing and algorithmic discounting are playing an increasing and still growing role in the retail sphere, though smaller than one might expect. The share of e-commerce
retail sales as a percentage of total sales rose from 0.6% at the end of 1999 to
6% at the end of 2013, seasonally adjusted. See E-Commerce Retail Sales as a
Percent of Total Sales, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECON. RES. (Aug. 17,
2015), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ECOMPCTSA. Nonstore retail
sales grew at a compound annual rate of 9% between 1992 and 2013. See Retail Trade: Nonstore Retailers, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECON. RES.
(Oct. 14, 2015), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/RSNSR. Discount
department stores grew at a compound annual rate or 1% between 1992 and
2013, while supercenters and warehouse stores categorized as general merchandise stores grew at 13%. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONTHLY RETAIL
TRADE REPORT (2015), http://www.census.gov/retail/index.html (click on the
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The methods and metrics for assessing change in the retail
sector can be debated and challenged, as can the causes of success and failure for different retailers and different types of retailers. However, a few developments since 1969 are apparent.
The original discounters emerged, the category killers followed,
e-commerce arrived. Some traditional retailers survived, some
discounters survived, and some electronic retailers have performed better than others. Over the years, this has added up to
remarkable competitive change at many stages—and the face
of retailing today looks quite different than 1969.
In retrospect, Pitofsky’s 1977 position could be viewed two
ways in light of the evolution of retail markets. These transformations that have seemingly served consumers well have
unfolded in an environment unfettered by federal fictitious
pricing enforcement. However, the initial emergence and early
success of discounters coincided with the height of enforcement,
so separating out the effects of non-enforcement proves difficult, if not impossible—especially given other massive economic
factors. Nonetheless, the stark changes in the retail industry
alone justify a revisit of the FTC’s nearly fifty-year old stance.
3.

Recent Developments

Though inexpensive technology now offers real-time tools
to facilitate consumer price comparison, the impact of this innovation might be overstated. Some consumers shop increasingly with mobile or internet price comparison technology, but
358
many do not. The Internet’s promise of price transparency
has not been realized. In light of the notion that the Internet
has been perceived as the consumer’s “best friend,” the apparent “explosion of less-than-stellar deals advertised on the
link entitled “Excel (1992-present)” next to the “Retail and Food Services
Sales” statement under the “Monthly Retail Trade Report” header to download
an Excel spreadsheet of the data from which these numbers were calculated).
358. Survey data tend to vary, but though they show shifts toward technology-driven price shopping, not all consumers claim to shop that way. In 2013,
only half of American adults had a smartphone rendering access to in-store
SMITH,
PEW
RES.
CTR.,
SMARTPHONE
comparisons.
AARON
OWNERSHIP 2013 (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone
-ownership-2013. According to one 2012 private study, of those visiting mobile
retail sites, 19% indicated that “looking up price information” was their “primary task.” FORESEE, FORESEE MOBILE SATISFACTION INDEX: RETAIL EDITION
1, 10 (2012), http://www.foresee.com/assets/foresee-mobile-index-retail-edition
.pdf. Of course, these data are in flux. As the Overstock.com case indicates, the
Internet might not enable people to escape deceptive-pricing traps. Also, it
remains unclear whether a mobile device would yield useful comparative information to a consumer shopping at an outlet mall, for example.
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web . . . is a bit surprising” for some, given the widespread anticipation that it would “liberate [consumers] from price gim359
micks.”
Though the web and associated mobility tools offer more
avenues for price comparison, advertised discount deals still
360
proliferate, and the lowest final price might not always prevail. Even though price comparison technology can lower
search costs, time remains scarce, leaving room for suboptimal
361
deals. Not to be forgotten, brick-and-mortar retail continues
362
to adapt quickly. For example, the aforementioned “outlet” or
“factory outlet” format for retail clothing distribution has grown
363
at the expense of other formats. Since World War II, the en364
tirety of the retail sector has continuously evolved.
Though making conclusions about the role of fictitious pricing in these contexts may require more study, it is incontrovertible that the changes in retail over the past forty years have
been dramatic. These changes in competition might have shifted the optimal amount of enforcement away from none, given
that competition has proven quite robust. Because the literature supports the conclusion that fictitious pricing harms welfare, and that discounting has proliferated, this Article contends that at the very least, this justifies experimentation with
359. Manjoo, supra note 28. As author William Poundstone noted, though
many predicted, “the Internet was going to usher in a golden age for consumers, where everyone would start comparison-shopping . . . . [B]ut we are all
busy, distracted, and we have limited time and attention to devote to research,
so we all fall victim to these tricks.” Id.
360. They proliferate even on transparent Internet sites. For example,
Barnes & Noble’s website displays David Lat’s novel, Supreme Ambitions, at a
regular or manufacturers’ price of $22.95, with a discount of 30% and a price
of $16.02. See Supreme Ambitions: A Novel, BARNES & NOBLE, http://www
.barnesandnoble.com/w/supreme-ambitions-david-lat/1119652044 (as of Dec.
27, 2014). If the Barnes & Noble’s discount prevented further searching, Amazon’s price of $15.87 (also displayed against a price of $22.95) would be missed.
Supreme Ambitions: A Novel, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Supreme
-Ambitions-David-Lat/dp/1627220461 (as of Dec. 27, 2014). See Compeau et
al., supra note 9, at 291.
361. See Manjoo, supra note 28.
362. See supra Part IV.B.3.
363. In a 2011 snapshot, factory-outlet apparel sales grew at 17.9%, while
total industry apparel sales grew at just over 1%. Consumers Shopping for
Value Propel Growth Trends, NPD GRP. (July 12, 2011), https://www.npd
.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/press-releases/pr_110712. Evidence shows that
this channel strategy has proven successful. See Yi Qian et al., Multichannel
Spillovers from a Factory Store (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19176, 2013) (introduction of a factory store channel tends to boost
sales across a retailer’s channels).
364. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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enforcement.
C. POTENTIAL ENFORCEMENT ZONES
Fictitious-pricing enforcement should be reintroduced
gradually and with an eye toward empirical measurement of
impact on pricing and advertising. Evaluating the impact of the
actions taken against Michaels Stores and JABC by New York
State Attorney General would provide a starting point, for example, to measure whether the targets complied, how their
competition reacted, and how pricing and competition changed
in comparison to nearby states. Beyond that, certain zones may
be ripe candidates for investigating fictitious pricing practices
and follow-up enforcement, if required. This Article does not offer an exclusive list of zones for enforcement, nor venues within
each zone. However, recognizing the FTC’s cost-benefit approach, this Article offers ideas for where the FTC (or state attorneys general) might begin enforcement experimentation.
1. Strong Brands, Credible Discount Channels
Where brands have strong quality credibility, and the selling channel has strong “discount” credibility, consumers may
be more prone to expect that they will receive items of high
quality while receiving believable advertised discounts. The
discounts come with an implicit narrative explaining their existence. Retail discount outlets, for example, offer consumers an
implied representation that their stores sell brand items that
may have been overstocked or moved from flagship stores, or
that the item is offered at a lower price than the flagship store.
With outlet-mall pricing, Senator Blumenthal may have selected the right place to plant a pulpit for advocating renewed fed365
eral enforcement of fictitious pricing.
An investigation into the pricing practice of retailers who
366
use this fast-growing format might reinforce pricing integrity.
Non-outlet retailers offering genuine discounts may recover
share if consumers pause before using the “outlet model / overstock” representation as a search characteristic and then instore pricing as a compounded search characteristic in that
365. Senator Blumenthal expressed concern that when forming the discount offers, outlet items were not being matched to similar quality items at
the flagship stores. Hladky, supra note 2. He references a form of deceptive
reference point pricing somewhat different from fictitious pricing.
366. This Article concedes that an investigation might clear these retailers
of fictitious pricing practices, which would serve a public purpose of building
confidence in an “honest” channel.
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context. Outlet stores, as noted previously, are a fast growing
brick-and-mortar channel, and intervention might make it
more likely for consumer searches to stop at the “best offer367
ing.” Experimental enforcement in this zone would be warranted.
2. Discount-Promotion Zones
Retailers that rely upon discount pricing as part of their
brand are also prime candidates for investigation. A retailer
that constantly promotes discounts tries to lure buyers to its offerings—and the advertised discounts may stunt the search,
especially if the location is physical. The Overstock.com case offered an example of a retailer expressly marketing as a discounter online. Retailers that offer, either expressly or implicit368
ly, that they “compare prices so [the consumer] don’t have to”
should be subject to scrutiny because they are explicitly encouraging consumers to end the search. Perhaps retailers that
promote that they will “match or beat any price” are also trying
to stunt the search, with the implication that the retailer probably already has the lowest price—or one close enough not to
warrant continued consumer search. These representations or
practices may not necessarily mislead, but that these retailers
are relying heavily on pricing representations warrants scrutiny. Again, this Article suggests regulatory investigation, and if
there is subsequent enforcement, measurement of the regulatory impact to see if enforcement has a net social benefit.
In sum, an approach similar to the one reached by the
Overstock.com court should be applied to situations that fall in
these categories. Injunctive relief would be paramount for protecting consumers, and penalties would deter. Because individual harm is difficult to conceptualize, it need not be recovered—
the broader social harm should be remediated and prevented.
Such actions should only be pursued if the costs prove to outweigh benefits, but such a determination has not been made
since enforcement ceased in 1969.
CONCLUSION
Today’s retail environment vastly differs from the one that
regulators faced in 1969, when the FTC demoted fictitiouspricing enforcement as an agenda priority to a non-concern. In
367. See supra Part IV.B.3.
368. People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RG10-546833, 2014 WL 657516, at
*3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2014) (citation omitted).
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1969, the core works undergirding behavioral economics had
not yet been written, though circumstantial evidence indicates
that marketers believed that discounts and fictitious discounts
induced sales. Today, regulators have the benefit of dozens of
detailed studies into the welfare impact of fictitious pricing.
The current marketplace immerses consumers in a competitive
retail environment with an entirely new class of retailers and
omnipresent discounting.
Given the accumulated knowledge since 1969 about the
power of discounting in influencing consumer behavior—and
the established consensus that fictitious prior-reference pricing
diminishes welfare—it is time to revisit regulatory acquiescence to what has become a commercial tradition. Federal regulators should reexamine enforcement of fictitious pricing. If
welfare is enhanced as a product of early enforcement forays,
then the FTC should judiciously accelerate enforcement at least
until welfare returns diminish.

